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Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 20 June 2014 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

The situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, continues to deteriorate and tensions continue to rise as a result of provocations and illegal actions by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people. Of grave concern in particular at this time is the precarious condition of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails and detention centres and, more specifically, Palestinian prisoners who have been on a prolonged hunger strike in an expression of collective non-violent protest against the abusive treatment and deplorable conditions they are being subjected to in Israel's jails and detention centres and in peaceful demand for their human rights.

Today, 20 June 2014, marks the fifty-seventh day in which hundreds of Palestinian prisoners have been on a hunger strike in protest of their captivity by Israel, the occupying Power, under administrative detention, whereby they are being held without charge and without access to due process of the law or fair trial. More than 60 Palestinian prisoners and detainees have been hospitalized and many are in critical condition, including 9 who are suffering from a dropped heartbeat and 20 others who are suffering from internal bleeding. Moreover, in a move that is sure to inflame already heightened tensions, a legislative amendment on force-feeding, which also contains a new provision to allow for the sedation of prisoners who refuse force-feeding, will be presented before the Israeli Knesset on Monday, 23 June. Force-feeding contravenes international law and is universally considered to be a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The practice is not only completely unsuitable for saving lives but is tantamount to torture, and Israel must be compelled to drop such a bill, which is in complete contravention of international standards.

We reiterate that Israel, the occupying Power, is fully responsible for the well-being, safety and lives of the thousands of Palestinians in its captivity, including the

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hundreds who are on hunger strike. The international community is duty-bound to ensure that the occupying Power complies with all its legal obligations regarding its treatment of all the Palestinian prisoners and detainees it is holding, including children, and Israel must be held accountable for its ill-treatment of and violations against the thousands of Palestinians it holds captive. Israel, the occupying Power, cannot be allowed to remain immune from the provisions of international humanitarian and human rights law governing such situations. If the occupying Power continues to reject the demands for respect for international law, then measures aimed at ensuring an end to the violations and ensuring that the rule of law prevails must be undertaken in response. We continue to call for an end to Israel's unlawful practices and, in particular, to cease the use of administrative detention to hold Palestinian civilians captive. We also continue to call for their immediate release, along with all other Palestinians being unlawfully and arbitrarily imprisoned and detained.

Moreover, I regret to inform you that since my last letter dated 17 June 2014 (A/ES-10/631-S/2014/418), the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, continues to deteriorate as a result of the repressive and illegal measures that continue to be undertaken by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people. In connection with the three Israeli settlers who went missing on Friday, 13 June while they were hitchhiking from the so-called settlement of Kfar Etzion, which is located between Jerusalem and Al-Khalil (Hebron), the Israeli occupying forces have escalated their aggression and have continued to carry out measures of collective punishment against the Palestinian people. In the Gaza Strip, Israeli occupying forces have continued to carry out air strikes, injuring more and more Palestinians and causing great fear and distress among the population, who continue to suffer from deplorable living conditions as a result of Israel's inhumane, unlawful blockade.

Furthermore, in the West Bank, violent raids by the occupying forces into Palestinian towns and villages continue. In fact, more than 1,150 locations, which include homes, offices and schools, have been violently raided by the Israeli occupying forces since the three Israeli settlers went missing. The number of Palestinians who have now been detained has risen to 330, which includes 24 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. It should be noted that many of the Palestinians who have been detained by the occupying forces were Palestinians who were released in a prisoner swap agreement in 2011. Moreover, in addition to the above measures of collective punishment, Israeli occupying forces have also continued to use excessive and indiscriminate force against the Palestinian civilian population. In this regard, today, Friday, 20 June, Mustafa Hosni Aslan, 22 years, was shot in the head and killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Qalandiya refugee camp south of Ramallah. Earlier today, Mahmoud Jihad Muhammad Dudeen, 14 years old, was shot in the chest and killed by Israeli occupying forces in the southern West Bank city of Dura, near Al-Khalil (Hebron). Mahmoud Dudeen was the third Palestinian to be killed by Israeli occupying forces in connection with the three missing Israeli settlers. Scores of Palestinians have also been injured as a result of Israeli aggression over the past week.

We reiterate our total condemnation of all of these illegal actions and crimes being perpetrated by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which are dramatically raising tensions and destabilizing the situation on the ground. We call once again on the international

community and specifically on the Security Council to act collectively to address this crisis to prevent its exacerbation and to bring an end to all of the human rights violations against the Palestinian people by the occupying Power, including all of its measures of collective punishment. The international community, including the Security Council, cannot continue to fail to act to hold Israel accountable for its flagrant breaches of the law. Such continued failure by the international community has only further emboldened the occupying Power and bolstered its impunity, which has resulted in the continuation of the above-mentioned Israeli violations and thus the failure to secure a just and lasting peace.

The present letter is in follow-up to our 498 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 17 June 2014 (A/ES-10/631-S/2014/418) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter circulated as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2014/430

Security Council

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25 June 2014

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France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 2112 (2013) and 2153 (2014), and the statements of its President relating to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, resolutions 2116 (2013) and 2128 (2013) on the situation in Liberia and resolution 2100 (2013) on the situation in Mali,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire and recalling the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Recalling that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire bears primary responsibility for ensuring peace, stability and the protection of civilians in Côte d'Ivoire,

Welcoming Côte d'Ivoire's ratification of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions on Statelessness and the steps being taken to revise its nationality laws and recalling the Secretary-General's decision on Durable Solutions and expressing support for the implementation of the national durable solution strategy for internally displaced persons,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 15 May 2014 (S/2014/342),

Welcoming the progress being made in Côte d'Ivoire on the path of reconciliation, stability and economic recovery and commending the leadership of the President of Côte d'Ivoire in this regard,

Welcoming the significant improvement in the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, including in the western part of the country and along the border with Liberia, while *condemning* the attacks of 23 February 2014 and 15 May 2014, *acknowledging* the need to address remaining challenges and *noting* the continued and increased cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), as well as the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and countries in the subregion, in coordinating activities, including on security, in the border areas in the subregion,

Calling upon all national stakeholders, including political parties, civil society and the media, to work together to consolidate the progress made so far and to address the underlying causes of tension and conflict including with respect to land and nationality, *encouraging* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to strengthen the rule of law, as well as reforms on the legal framework for elections, with a view to the

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presidential election scheduled for October 2015, *taking note* in this regard of the adoption of the law reforming the Commission Électorale Indépendante, and *welcoming* the initial steps taken by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to facilitate an environment conducive to fair, credible, and transparent elections, while *underlining* the necessity for further efforts in this field,

Taking note of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire's 18 June 2014 letter to the Secretary-General requesting the possible provision of electoral assistance,

Welcoming the continued improvement of the humanitarian situation, in particular the continued voluntary, safe and durable return of refugees and the majority of persons displaced by the post-elections crisis to their places of origin in Côte d'Ivoire,

Taking note of the final framework on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) adopted by the Autorité du DDR (ADDR) and the successful disarmament and demobilization of more than 30,000 former combatants while *expressing concern* at the low ratio of former combatants associated with the previous government that has been processed through the DDR programme and the 43,000 former combatants that remain armed and unemployed,

Welcoming the progress made in implementing the security sector reform strategy and *underlining* the importance of national ownership of this priority issue, as well as measures to rebuild confidence within and between security forces and with the population ahead of the presidential election,

Emphasizing the importance of pursuing a national reconciliation and social cohesion strategy, *welcoming* in this regard the extension of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission's mandate and *underlining* the importance of including all Ivoirians in the reconciliation process at the national and local levels,

Reiterating the vital role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and their key role in re-establishing the fabric of societies recovering from conflict, and further reaffirming the importance of implementing the Côte d'Ivoire National Action Plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) adopted in 2008,

Expressing its concern about the continued reports, including those reported by the Secretary-General in his report of 15 May 2014 (S/2014/342), of human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including against women and children, in particular sexual violence, stressing the importance of investigating and prosecuting such alleged violations and abuses, including those that occurred throughout the post-elections crisis committed by all parties, irrespective of their status or political affiliation,

Welcoming the transfer of Charles Blé Goudé, former leader of the Young Patriots, to the International Criminal Court (ICC), *further welcoming* national and international efforts to bring to justice alleged perpetrators of violations and abuses of human rights and of violations of international humanitarian law, *urging* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to increase and expedite its efforts to combat impunity and ensure equitable and independent justice without discrimination, and *encouraging* in this regard the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to continue its close cooperation with the ICC,

Welcoming the initiative taken by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to enhance political dialogue with the opposition, including extra-parliamentary parties, *commending* the good offices efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, especially in support of the dialogue between the Government and opposition political parties, and *expressing its appreciation* for the work of UNOCI and its overall contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire,

Expressing concern at reports of human rights violations and abuses in detention, calls upon the government to ensure that the conditions of detention of detainees are in line with international obligations and to take all steps necessary to prevent and investigate violations and abuse of human rights in the context of detention and *welcomes* the support provided by the European Union and France in this regard,

Commending the contribution of troop- and police-contributing countries and donors to the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), underlining the importance of providing military troops and police officers qualified with appropriate specialized and linguistic skills,

Recalling its intention as expressed in its resolution 2112 (2013) to consider a further reduction of two battalions based on the evolution of security conditions on the ground and an improved capacity of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to gradually take over UNOCI's security role,

Recognizing the continued contribution of the arms embargo, as defined by resolution 2153 (2014), to the stability of Côte d'Ivoire including by countering the illicit transfer, destabilization, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons,

Commending the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for their efforts to consolidate peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, and encouraging them to continue to support the Ivorian authorities in addressing key challenges, especially the underlying causes of conflict and insecurity in the border area, including the movement of armed elements and weapons, and promoting justice and national reconciliation,

Determining that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

National reconciliation and social cohesion

1. *Welcomes* the resumption of the dialogue between the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the political opposition on 22 May 2014, *calls upon* all political parties to play a constructive role and contribute towards reconciliation;

2. *Commends* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for her good offices efforts and political support and *requests* that such important efforts and support continue, in particular with a view to the presidential election to be held in October 2015, in line with paragraph 19 (b) of this resolution;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of pursuing a national reconciliation and social cohesion strategy, particularly ahead of the October 2015 presidential

election, through concrete measures to promote justice and reconciliation at all levels and involving all stakeholders and *calls for* a direct, open and constructive dialogue between the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and all political parties, including the opposition, to expedite further progress on crucial reforms on nationality and land, as well as on the framework for elections;

4. *Urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to take swiftly all necessary steps to establish, in accordance with the existing time frame, the legal framework for the October 2015 presidential election, including the setting up of the Commission Électorale Indépendante, the updating of the voters list, the electoral framework, and the allocation of adequate budgetary resources, and *calls upon* all national stakeholders to facilitate the creation of an environment conducive to the holding of free, fair, transparent, and inclusive presidential elections, and to refrain from acts that could incite violence, including hate speech;

5. *Affirms* its intention to review the listing of individuals subject to the financial and travel measures imposed by paragraphs 9 to 12 of resolution 1572 (2004) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011) provided they engage in actions that further the objective of national reconciliation;

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)

6. *Calls upon* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to complete the DDR process before the presidential election of 2015 in accordance with the objective announced by the President of Côte d'Ivoire of processing 74,000 former combatants, *requests* UNOCI to facilitate the implementation of this process, including by enhancing its technical support to the ADDR and swiftly disbursing support to the Ivoirian DDR programme and *further calls* on Member States and regional and international organizations to provide financial contributions to meet the needs of the DDR programme;

7. *Encourages* the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) to facilitate the planning and implementation of programmes which support this process, in consultation with UNOCI and international partners;

8. *Urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to provide for a transparent and inclusive DDR process that includes former combatants associated with the previous government, *encourages* further efforts by the ADDR to enhance the collection and disposal of weapons and ammunitions as part of the DDR process and *reiterates* the need for the Government to develop solutions for the sustained social and economic integration of former combatants, including former female combatants;

Security sector reform (SSR)

9. *Calls upon* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to accelerate the implementation of the national security sector reform strategy adopted in September 2012 and updated in 2014 with a view to setting up inclusive and accountable security forces that include an effective chain of command, a system of military justice and adequate and sustainable budgetary allocations;

10. *Underscores* in this regard the importance of accelerating the deployment of the police and gendarmerie to take over public order tasks currently performed by the Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) and other groups, including by equipping the police and gendarmerie with standard policing weapons and

ammunition following the partial lifting of the arms embargo pursuant to its resolution 2153 (2014);

11. *Reiterates its call* to the Government and all international partners, including private companies, involved in assisting the Government in the SSR process, to comply with the provisions of resolution 2153 (2014) and to coordinate their efforts with a view to promoting transparency and a clear division of labour between all international partners;

Human rights

12. *Strongly urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to ensure in the shortest possible time frame that, irrespective of their status or political affiliation, all those responsible for serious abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those committed during and after the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, are brought to justice in accordance with its international obligations and that all detainees receive clarity about their status in a transparent manner, and *urges* the Government to continue its cooperation with the International Criminal Court;

13. *Emphasizes*, in this regard, the importance of the work of the National Commission of Inquiry and the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to lasting reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire, *calls for* the implementation and conclusion of related investigations, further *calls on* the Government to create the enabling environment to ensure that the work of the Ivorian judicial system is impartial, credible, transparent and consistent with internationally agreed standards and, in this regard, *welcomes* the renewal of the Special Investigation and Examination cell and *encourages* the Government to enhance its support for its effective operations;

14. *Urges* the Government to take concrete and discernible steps to prevent and mitigate inter-communal violence by seeking a broad national consensus on addressing effectively identity and land tenure issues;

15. *Welcomes* the establishment of a national human rights commission, *underscores* the importance of its independence and its compliance with the Paris Principles related to the work of National Human Rights institutions and *calls* on UNOCI to continue to support Ivoirian authorities and institutions in ensuring the human rights of all persons;

16. *Calls on* those responsible to cease committing acts of sexual and gender-based violence immediately, and further calls upon UNOCI, where consistent with its authorities and responsibilities, to continue to support national and international efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of grave abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire, irrespective of their status or political affiliation;

17. *Welcomes* the continued cooperation between, and the conduct of coordinated activities by, UNOCI and the FRCI and *calls for* strict adherence by the FRCI to international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws and in this context, *recalls* the importance of training in human rights, child protection and sexual- and gender-based violence for security and law-enforcement agencies;

UNOCI mandate

18. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNOCI until 30 June 2015;

19. *Decides* that the mandate of UNOCI shall be the following:

(a) Protection of civilians

– To protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Ivorian authorities, the civilian population from threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment and *encourages* UNOCI to move to a more preventive and pre-emptive posture in pursuit of its priorities and in active defence of its mandate, building on positive steps taken so far, without prejudice to the agreed basic principles of peacekeeping;

– To implement the comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians in coordination with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT);

– To work closely with humanitarian agencies, particularly in relation to areas of tensions and with respect to the return of displaced persons, to collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population, and bring them to the attention of the Ivorian authorities as appropriate;

(b) Political support

– To provide good offices and political support for the efforts of the Ivoirian authorities to address the root causes of the conflict and establish lasting peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire, including in the priority areas of the SSR, DDR, and reconciliation processes at both the national and local levels;

– To provide good offices support to the Ivoirian authorities in the preparation for the presidential election to be held in 2015, including by facilitating dialogue between all political stakeholders, inclusive of representatives of civil society and political parties;

(c) Address remaining security threats and border-related challenges

– To support, within its existing authorities, capabilities, and its areas of deployment, the national authorities in stabilizing the security situation in the country, with a special attention to providing support for the provision of security through the October 2015 presidential election;

– To monitor and deter the activities of militias, mercenaries and other illegal armed groups and to support the Government in addressing border security challenges consistent with its existing mandate to protect civilians, including cross-border security and other challenges in the border areas, notably with Liberia, and to this end, to coordinate closely with UNMIL in order to further inter-mission cooperation, such as through undertaking coordinated patrols and contingency planning where appropriate and within their existing mandates and capabilities;

– To liaise with the Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) in order to promote mutual trust among all elements composing the FRCI;

(d) Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (DDR) and collection of weapons

- To assist the Government, in close coordination with other bilateral and international partners, in implementing without further delay the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and dismantling of militias and self-defence groups, taking into account the rights and needs of the distinct categories of persons to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated, including children and women;

- To support the registration and screening of former combatants and assist in assessing and verifying the reliability of the listings of former combatants;

- To support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements, where relevant in cooperation with UNMIL and United Nations Country Teams in the region;

- To assist the national authorities, including the National Commission to fight against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in collecting, registering, securing and disposing of weapons and in clearing explosive remnants of war, as appropriate, in accordance with resolution 2153 (2014);

- To coordinate with the Government in ensuring that the collected weapons are not disseminated or re-utilized outside a comprehensive national security strategy, as referred to in point (e) below;

(e) Reconstitution and reform of security institutions

- To assist the Government in implementing, without delay and in close coordination with other international partners, its comprehensive national security strategy;

- To support the Government in providing effective, transparent and harmonized coordination of assistance, including the promotion of a clear division of tasks and responsibilities, by international partners to the security sector reform (SSR) process;

- To advise the Government, as appropriate, on SSR and the organization of the future national army, to facilitate the provision of training, within its current resources and as requested by the Government and in close coordination with other international partners, in human rights, child protection and protection from sexual and gender-based violence to the security and law enforcement institutions, as well as capacity-building support by providing technical assistance, co-location and mentoring programmes for the police and gendarmerie and to contribute to restoring their presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire and to promote trust and confidence within and between the security and law enforcement agencies and to offer support to the development of a sustainable vetting mechanism for personnel that will be absorbed into security sector institutions;

(f) Monitoring of the arms embargo

- To monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004), in cooperation with the Group of Experts established under resolution 1584 (2005), including by inspecting, as they deem it

necessary and when appropriate without notice, all weapons, ammunition and related materiel regardless of location, consistent with resolution 2153 (2014);

- To collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel brought into Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004), and to dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate;

- To assist the Government, upon its request and within its existing resources, to ensure the Government's notification and approval requests contain the required information identified in paragraph 7 of resolution 2153 (2014) consistent with paragraph 9 of resolution 2153 (2014);

(g) Support for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law

- To contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire, with special attention to grave violations and abuses committed against children and women, notably sexual- and gender-based violence, in close coordination with the Independent Expert established under the Human Rights Council's resolution A/HRC/17/26;

- To monitor, help investigate, and report to the Council, on abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those against children in line with resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012) and 2143 (2014), in order to prevent such abuses and violations and to end impunity;

- To bring to the attention of the Council all individuals identified as perpetrators of serious human rights violations and to keep the Committee, established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004), informed of any significant developments in this regard when appropriate;

- To support the efforts of the Government in combating sexual- and gender-based violence, including through contributing to the development of a nationally owned multisectoral strategy in cooperation with UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict entities;

- To provide specific protection for women affected by armed conflict to ensure gender expertise and training, as appropriate and within existing resources, in accordance with resolutions 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013);

(h) Support humanitarian assistance

- To facilitate, as necessary, unhindered humanitarian access and to help strengthen the delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations, notably by contributing to enhancing security for its delivery;

- To support the Ivorian authorities in preparing for the voluntary, safe and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons in cooperation with relevant humanitarian organizations, and in creating security conditions conducive to it;

(i) Public information

– To continue to use UNOCI's broadcasting capacity, through ONUCI FM, to contribute to the overall effort to create a peaceful environment, through the October 2015 presidential election;

– To monitor any public incidents of incitement to hatred, intolerance and violence, and bring to the attention of the Council all individuals identified as instigators of political violence, and to keep the Committee established under resolution 1572 (2004) informed of any significant developments in this regard, when appropriate;

(j) Protection of United Nations personnel

– To protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;

20. *Authorizes* UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

21. *Decides* that the protection of civilians shall remain the priority of UNOCI, in accordance with paragraph 17 (a) above, and further *decides* that UNOCI shall put renewed focus on supporting the Government on DDR, collection of weapons and SSR, in accordance with paragraphs 17 (d) and (e) of this resolution, with the objective of transitioning security responsibilities from UNOCI to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire;

22. *Requests* UNOCI to ensure that any support provided to non-United Nations security forces is provided in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (HRDDP);

Force structure

23. *Recalls its intention* as affirmed in its resolution 2112 (2013) to consider a further reduction of two battalions and *decides* that UNOCI's uniformed personnel shall consist of up to 5,437 military personnel, comprising of 5,245 troop and staff officers and 192 military observers, by 30 June 2015;

24. *Decides* that the authorized strength of UNOCI's police component shall consist of up to 1,500 personnel, and *further decides* to maintain the 8 customs officers previously authorized;

25. *Affirms its intention* to consider further downsizing UNOCI, reviewing its mandate and its possible termination after the October 2015 presidential election based on security conditions on the ground and the capacity of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to take over UNOCI's security role;

26. *Acknowledges* the reconfiguration of UNOCI's military presence to concentrate resources in high-risk areas, as decided in its resolution 2112 (2013), *expresses support* for the new mobile concept of operations of UNOCI's military component, and *requests* UNOCI to further update its configuration in this regard after the additional downsizing of its military personnel, with a view to consolidating its locations and bases, focusing on the west and other high-risk areas as appropriate, while shifting to a mobile posture and enhancing its situational awareness and early warning capabilities;

27. *Requests* UNOCI to focus and continue to streamline its activities, across its military, police and civilian components in order to achieve progress on the tasks outlined in paragraph 19 above and fully reflect the downsizing of the military component and narrowing of the mandate decided in resolution 2112 (2013) and this resolution on the structure of the mission and *expresses its intention* to keep the requirements of and composition of UNOCI components under active review;

French Forces

28. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 2015 the authorization that the Security Council provided to the French Forces in order to support UNOCI, within the limits of their deployment and their capabilities;

29. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of UNOCI and of the French Forces, which support it, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Côte d'Ivoire to enable them to fully carry out their mandates;

Regional and inter-mission cooperation

30. *Calls on* the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia to continue reinforcing their cooperation, particularly with respect to the border area, including through increased monitoring, information-sharing and coordinated actions, and to implement the shared border strategy to inter alia support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements on both sides of the border and the voluntary and safe repatriation of refugees as well as to address the root causes of conflict and tension;

31. *Affirms* the importance of inter-mission cooperation arrangements as UNMIL and UNOCI downsize, *reaffirms* the inter-mission cooperation framework set out in its resolution 1609 (2005) and *further recalls* its endorsement in its resolution 2062 (2012) of the recommendation of the Secretary-General to transfer three armed helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI to be used in both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia along and across their border and *decides* that all UNOCI and UNMIL military utility helicopters shall be utilized in both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia in order to facilitate rapid response and mobility, while not affecting the area of responsibility of either mission;

32. *Welcomes* the proposal by the Secretary-General as set out in his report of 15 May 2014 (S/2014/342), to establish, in the context of inter-mission cooperation arrangements between UNMIL and UNOCI, for an initial period of one year and within the authorized military strength of UNOCI, a quick reaction force to implement UNOCI's mandate as defined in paragraph 19 of this resolution and to support UNMIL as defined in paragraph 33 of this resolution while recognizing that this unit will remain primarily a UNOCI asset;

33. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to deploy this unit to Liberia, subject to the consent of the troop-contributing countries concerned and the Government of Liberia, in the event of a serious deterioration of the security situation on the ground in order to temporarily reinforce UNMIL with the sole purpose of implementing its mandate, and *stresses* that this unit should prioritize implementation of UNOCI's mandate in Côte d'Ivoire;

34. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take steps to ensure that this unit reaches full operational capability as soon as possible, and no later than May 2015;

35. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council immediately of any deployment of this unit to Liberia and to obtain Security Council authorization for any such deployment for a period that exceeds 90 days;

36. *Calls upon* all United Nations entities in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, including all relevant components of UNOCI and UNMIL, within their respective mandates, capabilities and areas of deployment, to enhance their support for the stabilization of the border area, including through increased inter-mission cooperation and the development of a shared, strategic vision and plan, in support of the Ivoirian and Liberian authorities and support for implementing regional security strategies, including those of the Mano River Union and ECOWAS;

37. *Commends* inter-mission cooperation between UNOCI and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and encourages both United Nations missions to continue in this direction as authorized by paragraph 14 of its resolution 2100 (2013);

Reporting

38. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and the implementation of the mandate of UNOCI and to provide to it a midterm report no later than 15 December 2014 and a final report no later than 15 May 2015 on the situation on the ground and the implementation of this resolution;

39. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2014/431

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 June 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 20 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith elements of the plan of Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine, on the peaceful settlement of the situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine, taking into consideration the work of the trilateral contact group, comprising representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as the outcome of the meeting of the Head of State with the representatives of Lugansk and Donetsk regions (see annex).

President Poroshenko has already initiated implementation of the plan by ordering a unilateral ceasefire in the east of Ukraine, from 10 p.m. on 20 June until 10 a.m. on 27 June (Kyiv time).

Within this period, the wide range of issues covering the cessation of the use of force and the launch of a peaceful settlement process will be discussed.

I believe that the peace plan will give momentum to the restoration of peace and order in the east of Ukraine.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Sergeyev**

14-56039 (E) 240614 240614

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Annex to the letter dated 20 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Russian]

On peaceful settlement of the situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine

In the inaugural speech on 7 June 2014, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko stressed that he was assuming office in order to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Ukraine, to ensure sustainable peace and to guarantee security for all citizens.

President Poroshenko's plan for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine is based on three pillars:

- Release from criminal responsibility for those who surrendered weapons, did not commit grave crimes against the Ukrainian military and civilians and were not involved in illegal activities for financing terrorism
- Establishment of a controlled corridor for the retreat of Russian mercenaries
- The launch of an inclusive dialogue with peaceful citizens.

Subsequently, more details of the above plan were provided as follows:

1. Security guarantees for all those involved in the negotiations.
2. Release from criminal responsibility for those who surrendered weapons and did not commit grave crimes.
3. Release of all hostages.
4. Setting up of a 10-km buffer zone at the Ukrainian-Russian border and the withdrawal of illegal troops and heavy weaponry.
5. Guaranteed corridor for the retreat of Russian and Ukrainian mercenaries.
6. Disarmament of illegally armed groups.
7. Establishment of joint patrol units in the structure of the Ministry of the Interior.
8. Vacation of illegally seized official buildings in the Donetsk and Lubansk regions.
9. Renewal of work of the local authorities.
10. Renewal of central television and radio broadcasting in the Donetsk and Lubansk regions.
11. Decentralization of power (through direct elections of local executive committees; protection of the Russian language; and draft amendments to the Constitution).
12. Before the system for elections of local authorities is introduced and takes effect, agreement on the candidatures for the posts of governors with

representatives of the Donbas region (if there is no agreed position on the nominees, the decision is made by the President of Ukraine).

13. Early local and parliamentary elections.

14. Programme for the creation of new jobs in the region.

15. Restoration of industrial and social infrastructure.

The technical issues regarding implementation of the peace plan are being discussed within the framework of the trilateral contact group comprising representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

According to the agreed common vision, the plan will go through several consecutive stages of implementation.

The first stage will cover the cessation of the use of force for a short limited period of time by counter-terrorism forces and illegally armed groups. The counter-terrorism forces will resume activities only in the case of armed violence.

Within this period, the wide range of issues covering the cessation of use of force and the launch of the peaceful settlement process will be discussed.

The second stage will cover the negotiation process itself.

United Nations S/2014/432

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 June 2014
English
Original: French

Letter dated 23 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 20 June 2014 from the Special Representative of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and that organization's links with the Bashar Al-Assad regime (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gérard **Araud**

14-56067 (E) 240614 250614

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Annex to the letter dated 23 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

On behalf of the people of Syria and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, it is with grave alarm that I write to you regarding the recent military gains of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, and the urgent need for the Security Council to take comprehensive and sustained action to halt this looming threat to international peace and security.

It is the primary responsibility of all members of the Security Council to secure and maintain international peace and security. As required by Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council has a duty to carry out this responsibility where threats to international peace and security exist. There is growing reason to believe that the Assad regime — which has enabled the proliferation of ISIS — poses precisely such a threat.

The people of Syria do not want ISIS in their country or the region. The violent extremism of ISIS has no place in Syria — where people have long cherished their country's rich ethnic and religious diversity. ISIS originated in Iraq, during the insurgency in that country. Eventually, ISIS was allowed to move into Syria to establish a branch there, which led to cross-border operations by ISIS in both countries. We have seen this phenomenon in Syria for several months now, and it continues today. Since the beginning, the Syrian people have rejected ISIS and, in January, Free Syrian Army forces launched an all-out offensive against ISIS. In the past six months in particular, the Free Syrian Army has made significant progress against ISIS and forced ISIS to relinquish control of several areas in Syria. Indeed, the forces of the Free Syrian Army were the first to recognize the danger of ISIS and to fight against it, and they continue this fight today.

The Free Syrian Army's opposition to ISIS has not been matched by the Syrian regime. On the contrary, Assad and his loyalists have not merely ignored the threat posed by ISIS, they have actively exacerbated it.

On 10 June 2014, ISIS took over Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, and much of Nineveh Province. It has since set its sights on the capital of Iraq, Baghdad, in an effort to achieve its ultimate goal: to establish a caliphate across Iraq and the greater Levant.

At the outset of the revolution, the Syrian regime released extremists from its prisons. Those released subsequently joined the ranks of ISIS and other terrorist groups fighting in Syria. Since the incursion of ISIS into Syria in April 2013, the Assad regime has protected and assisted ISIS forces in their brutal tactics against the Syrian opposition and the Syrian people. Forces loyal to the Assad regime have selectively bypassed ISIS headquarters and areas under ISIS control by failing, in large part, to target ISIS strongholds in Raqqa, Jarablus and al-Danna (Idleb). ISIS, in turn, has spared regime-held areas in Deir Ezzor and the city of Aleppo, choosing instead to launch assaults on moderate opposition groups and use their resources to impose a brutal rule on Syrian civilians. Evidence also suggests that regime warplanes have offered protection to ISIS forces during attacks against the Free Syrian Army.

The Syrian regime's tactical alliance with ISIS forces extends to their financial support network. As ISIS has assumed control of lucrative gas and oil fields in areas such as Deir Ezzor Province, they have sold their oil and gas directly to the Syrian regime for a substantial profit. While paying lip service to the fight against terror, Assad is thus simultaneously underwriting ISIS terrorist operations — ensuring that ISIS has the financial means to pursue its violent and vicious military campaigns in Syria and Iraq.

Regime forces are not merely aiding and abetting ISIS militants, they may even be training them. The accounts of torture survivors suggest that traditional regime torture tactics are being replicated by ISIS forces. It has been reported that ISIS emirs have served as loyal officers of the Syrian regime and ISIS ammunition has been manufactured in factories of the Syrian Ministry of Defence. The Syrian regime may also have facilitated the movement of foreign ISIS forces into Syrian territory by providing them with access to Iranian visas, Russian passports and Iranian SIM cards. Indeed, according to media sources, the governor of Nineveh Province confirmed that ISIS is cooperating with the Syrian Government.

Clearly, the growing instability and violence in Iraq is directly connected to the Assad regime. Assad is not merely bolstering ISIS forces, he is actively creating a breeding ground for foreign terrorists whose ambition it is to imperil peace and stability in the wider region. With Assad's help, Syria has become the launching pad for terrorist actions in Iraq, just as Iraq once served as the launching pad for Al-Qaida incursions into Syria. To stop ISIS in Iraq, the Security Council must take decisive action now to end the conflict in Syria. As the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, the Syrian Coalition asks that you adopt with urgency a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter threatening real and deliberate action should the Syrian regime continue to assist and empower ISIS forces. Furthermore, we ask that you apply increased pressure on the Syrian regime, which will compel it to accept the terms and the necessity of the Geneva communiqué. Only a political solution that leads to a democratic transition will provide the peace and stability Syria needs to counteract groups like ISIS and end Assad's wilful complicity in terrorist attacks.

The growing instability in Iraq is not inevitable. The rising influence of ISIS can be stopped. The solution lies in ending the conflict in Syria and in collective action by a united Security Council.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian Coalition to the United Nations

United Nations A/68/912–S/2014/433

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
24 June 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 110
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 23 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

On Friday, 20 June 2014, the village of Hurrah in the Hama countryside was the target of a terrorist operation. Armed terrorist groups detonated a truck that had been packed with a vast amount of explosives, estimated to weigh approximately three tons, killing 35 civilians, some of whom were children and women, and injuring 50 others, some of whom are in critical condition. The explosion also destroyed a large number of homes and buildings in the village. On Thursday, 19 June 2014, the Nuzhah neighbourhood of Homs was the target of another attack by terrorists, who detonated a car bomb in a popular market located at a busy intersection. The explosion killed 6 civilians and injured 40 others and caused material damage to stores and vehicles.

These two new terrorist attacks are part of a series of random terrorist attacks against innocent civilians in all Syrian governorates. Civilians have been the victims of terrorist bombings, mortar attacks and other acts of terrorism committed by criminal gangs that are supported by States from the region and beyond. Those States are providing the terrorists with material and logistical support and political and media cover, even in international forums.

My country has unequivocally condemned all acts of terrorism, without distinction. It reaffirms its support for efforts to counter terrorism in Iraq and to stand up to the threat of *takfirist*, Wahhabist terrorism, which thrives on radical fatwas that call for the dissemination of rancour and hatred in our societies and that depict terrorism in certain countries as purportedly being popular revolutions. Those States that support terrorism in Syria and the region should take heed of past events and experiences and understand the growing threat represented by the escalation of terrorism, which shall transcend the States of the region and reach every corner of the world, including, in particular, those States that harbour and support terrorists.

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Terrorism is one and the same, regardless of where or when it occurs, and respects no boundaries.

The growing threat of terrorism in Syria and its recent escalation in Iraq requires a concerted international effort to counter it, without discrimination or double standards. The rise in terrorism also calls into question the credibility of the international counter-terrorism effort and the commitment to implement United Nations resolutions, including those of the Security Council, concerning counter-terrorism, the latest of which is resolution 2161 (2014). In that resolution, the Council calls on States to shoulder their responsibility to counter terrorism and to refrain from providing terrorist groups with material, moral and logistical support. Now, more than ever, the international community must demonstrate just how serious it is about sending a stern message to terrorists, and the States supporting them, that acts of terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances or for any reason, and that supporting terrorism will have serious consequences for its sponsors, all States of the region and the entire world. It is no longer acceptable that certain States members of the Security Council should be able to apply double standards with regard to condemning acts of terrorism. They have done so before, for the sake of narrow political interests and at the expense of the lives of innocent Syrians and their suffering. Syria calls on the Security Council and the Secretary-General to condemn clearly and strongly these crimes and take the measures required to hold accountable the perpetrators and those States and Powers, from the region and outside it, that stand behind them and have taken to boasting of their support for the terrorist groups that are currently wreaking havoc in Syria and the region.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 110, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2014/434

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 June 2014

Original: English

Identical letters dated 23 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On Sunday, tragedy struck once again and Israel lost another of her sons. In an unprovoked act of aggression, an anti-tank missile was launched from Syria into Israel, killing 13-year-old Mohammed Karkara and injuring four others. The attack intentionally targeted a civilian vehicle driving inside of Israel (west of the Alpha line and near United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) observation post 52).

School is out for the summer and instead of running in the parks, Israeli children are running for the bomb shelters. In the past week alone, Israeli citizens came under attack from three fronts. In the south, rockets are being fired from Gaza. In the north, missiles, rockets and mortars are raining down from Syria. And in Judea and Samaria, three teenagers were abducted by Hamas terrorists.

In the past five months, there have been more intentional attacks on the Israeli Golan Heights than in the past 40 years. Israel has repeatedly issued warnings through UNDOF and sent numerous letters to the Security Council warning that Syria's violations of the 1974 Israel-Syria separation of forces agreement will not be tolerated.

Israel has shown considerable restraint thus far, but it cannot be expected to stand by as its soldiers and citizens are intentionally targeted. I urge the Security Council to address this development immediately and hold the Government of Syria accountable for undermining international agreements and regional stability.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-56078 (E) 240614

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United Nations A/68/913–S/2014/435

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
24 June 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 23 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On Sunday, 22 June and Monday, 23 June 2014, in yet another blatant violation of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, the Charter of the United Nations and international law, Israeli occupying forces committed a fresh aggression against positions in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. Those forces fired tank and mortar shells and two rockets, and five Israeli aircraft attacked positions of the Syrian law enforcement forces, killing four persons and wounding nine others and causing substantial damage to installations and equipment. The air strikes by the Israeli enemy air force coincided with attacks by armed terrorist groups against law enforcement positions. The attacks were repulsed by the troops manning those positions. This Israeli aggression occurred within earshot and before the eyes of Mr. Hervé Ladsous, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, who was present in the operations room of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force as it closely monitored these Israeli aggressions all along the ceasefire line.

This new Israeli aggression is part of the Israeli enemy's ongoing direct support for armed terrorist group in the area of separation. It took place after the terrorist gangs had suffered heavy losses at the hands of Syrian law enforcement forces. It is not only a flagrant violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, but also threatens the safety and security of United Nations personnel. Israel continues to carry out aggressions and provocative actions, whether by directly providing logistical support to terrorist groups or by direct military aggression against Syrian territory in order to protect these groups.

In conveying to the Secretary-General and the Security Council the details of these grave Israeli aggressions, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic calls on the Council to shoulder its responsibilities and implement its resolutions, in order to deter Israel from continuing with its attempts to exacerbate the situation and threaten security and peace in the region and beyond. Syria calls on the Security

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Council to condemn clearly these aggressions, which are a blatant violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, and Israel's direct support for terrorist groups operating in the area of separation and the surrounding areas, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the Council's counter-terrorism resolutions.

Syria once again calls on the Security Council to enforce compliance with its relevant resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 497 (1981), which reject Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan and call for Israel to withdraw from all Arab territory it occupies, including the occupied Syrian Golan, to the line of 4 June 1967.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2014/436

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 June 2014

Original: English

Australia, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular 2100 (2013) and 2085 (2012), its Presidential Statements of 23 January 2014 (S/PRST/2014/2) and 12 December 2013 (S/PRST/2013/20), and its press statements of 11 June 2014, 20 May 2014 and 23 April 2014,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Underscoring the need to address the underlying causes of recurrent crises which have affected Mali, including governance, security, development and humanitarian challenges, drawing lessons from past peace agreements, and that any sustainable solution to the crisis in Mali should be Malian-owned, including all aspects of the political process, in particular national dialogue and reconciliation,

Welcoming the successful holding of peaceful and transparent presidential elections on 28 July and 11 August 2013 as well as legislative elections on 24 November and 15 December 2013 in Mali, which constitute a major step in the restoration of democratic governance and the full return of constitutional order in Mali, and *commending* the people and authorities of Mali for the manner in which they were conducted,

Welcoming the signing on 18 June 2013 of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, which, inter alia, reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and secular nature of the Malian State, provides for an immediate ceasefire and the launching of the cantonment process, establishes a framework for inclusive peace talks with all communities of the North of Mali, but *expressing its concern* at the failure of the parties to the Agreement to meet the agreed timeline for the launching of these talks,

Commending the efforts of all regional and international actors, including those who facilitated discussions with the signatory and adherent armed groups of

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the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, to solve the crisis in Mali, and, in this regard, *welcoming* the efforts of Algeria to contribute to the launching of a credible and inclusive negotiation process, as well as Burkina Faso as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mediator, and *urging* all these actors to maintain coordination to consolidate political and security progress in Mali, in close coordination with the Special Representative for Mali and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),

Welcoming the appointment by the Malian President on 23 April 2014 of a High-Representative for the Inter-Malian Inclusive Dialogue and his initial efforts to consult with national and international actors on the peace process,

Condemning strongly the violent clashes in Kidal on 17 and 18 May 2014 in the context of the Malian Prime Minister's visit, which resulted in the death of Malian Defence and Security Forces personnel, as well as eight civilians, including six Government officials, the unacceptable seizure by the armed groups, notably the Mouvement national de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), of administrative buildings, including the Governorate of Kidal, the subsequent seizure of towns in the North of Mali, and the reported illegal establishment of parallel administrative structures therein, and of arms and materiels belonging to the Malian Defence and Security Forces, which constitute a breach of the ceasefire arrangements provided for by the Agreement, as well as attacks on personnel of MINUSMA by the armed groups, *expressing serious concern* about the events that occurred in Kidal and elsewhere in the North of Mali on 21 May 2014 which resulted in additional casualties and in an altered security landscape in the North of Mali, and *reiterating* its call on all parties to act with restraint and refrain from any further violence that could threaten civilians,

Welcoming the signing of the cease-fire agreement of 23 May 2014, brokered under the auspices of the African Union (AU) Chair Mauritanian President Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, and *welcoming* the convening of the ECOWAS Summit in Accra on 30 May 2014, taking note of its support for the cease-fire agreement and its call for a political solution, through the launching of inclusive peace talks, as well as its call for the immediate withdrawal of the armed groups from the public buildings and occupied areas, and return to the pre-17 May positions, and *further welcoming* the signing on 13 June 2014 of the agreement on the modalities for the ceasefire implementation,

Remaining concerned over the fragile security situation in the North of Mali and the continuing activities in the Sahel region of terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Eddine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Al Mourabitoune, which constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond, and *reiterating* its strong condemnation of the abuses of human rights and violence against civilians, notably women and children, committed in the North of Mali and in the region by terrorist groups,

Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and regional and international organizations to impede, impair, and isolate the terrorist threat, and *reaffirming* that terrorism could not and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization,

Recalling the listing of MUJAO, the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Eddine and its leader Iyad Ag Ghali, and Al Mourabitoune on the Al-Qaida sanctions list established by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), and *reiterating its readiness*, under the above-mentioned regime, to sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who do not cut off all ties to Al-Qaida and associated groups, including AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and Al Mourabitoune, in accordance with the established listing criteria,

Welcoming the continued action by the French forces, at the request of the Malian authorities, to deter the terrorist threat in the North of Mali,

Noting with growing concern the transnational dimension of the terrorist threat in the Sahel region and *underlying* the need for a coherent regional response to combat this threat,

Expressing its continued concern over the serious threats posed by transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism, *strongly condemning* the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, *reiterating its determination* to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Sahel region, in accordance with applicable international law, *recalling* its resolution 2133 (2014) and including its call upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefitting directly or indirectly from the payment of ransoms or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages and, in this regard, *noting* the publication of the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF) "Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists",

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region and over the insecurity which hinders humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of armed groups, terrorist and criminal networks, and their activities, the presence of landmines as well as the continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens the peace, security, and stability of States in this region,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety of civilians receiving assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Mali and *stressing* the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of need,

Condemning strongly all abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those involving extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and sexual and gender-based violence, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children, attacks against schools and hospitals, and *calling upon* all parties to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with their obligations under applicable international law,

Reiterating, in this regard, that all perpetrators of such acts must be held accountable and that some of such acts referred to in the paragraph above may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute and *taking note* that, acting upon the referral of the transitional authorities of Mali dated 13 July 2012, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened, on 16 January 2013, an investigation into

alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012, and *recalling* the importance of assistance and cooperation, by all parties concerned, with the Court,

Emphasizing that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, *underscoring* the importance of Malian civilian control and oversight of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, *reiterating* that the training, consolidation and redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces are vital to ensure Mali's long-term security and stability and to protect the people of Mali, and *stressing* the importance of the Malian Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing security throughout the Malian territory,

Recognizing that the threat to the civilian population in the North of Mali extends beyond the key population centres to include rural areas,

Reiterating its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and for MINUSMA and *expressing* its concern at the slow pace of deployment of MINUSMA,

Commending the role and contribution of the AU, ECOWAS and of neighbouring countries to the stabilization of Mali, including to contribute to the efforts of MINUSMA towards a political settlement,

Commending the role of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in Mali to provide training and advice for the Malian Defence and Security Forces towards contributing to strengthening civilian authority and respect for human rights, and *welcoming* the decision of the European Union (EU) to establish the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) to provide strategic advice and training for the Police, Gendarmerie and Garde nationale in Mali,

Encouraging the international community to provide broad support to resolve the crisis in Mali through coordinated actions for immediate and long-term needs, encompassing security, governance reform, development and humanitarian issues, *commending* the contributions already made towards the 2014 Consolidated Appeal for Mali, and *urging* all Member States and other donors to contribute generously for humanitarian operations,

Determining that the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Framework for long-term peace and stability in Mali

1. *Urges* the Malian authorities and the signatory and adherent armed groups to fulfil their commitments under the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, and in this regard, *further urges* the parties in Mali to engage in good faith and without delay in a credible and inclusive negotiation process, respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, and *underscores* that this Agreement constitutes a solid basis for long-term peace and stability in Mali;

2. *Urges* the signatories to the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014 to respect it fully, to immediately implement its provisions, including the liberation of

prisoners and the establishment of an international commission of inquiry, and to take steps that support national reconciliation, and *requests* the Secretary-General to facilitate the swift establishment of the commission, in consultation with the parties;

3. *Urges* in particular the Malian authorities to launch without delay an inclusive and credible negotiation process with the signatory and adherent armed groups of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, and those armed groups in the North of Mali that have cut off all ties with terrorist organizations and committed unconditionally to the Agreement;

4. *Reiterates* its demand that all armed groups in Mali put aside their arms, cease hostilities immediately, as well as reject the recourse to violence and *urges* all such groups that have cut off all ties with terrorist organizations and who recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, to engage in an inclusive dialogue open to all communities of the North of Mali;

5. *Urges* all armed groups in Mali to resume the cantonment process, supported and monitored by MINUSMA, as a crucial and practical step leading to an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement;

6. *Expresses* its strong support for the key role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali in the peace talks, and *requests* the Special Representative to continue his good offices and active engagement, including in coordinating with and supporting the Malian authorities, towards the launching of an inclusive process open to all communities of the North of Mali, consistent with paragraph 13 (b) (i) and (ii);

7. *Urges further* the parties in this negotiation process to coordinate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, with the goal of securing a durable political resolution to the crisis and long-term peace and stability throughout the country, respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State;

8. *Urges* the Malian authorities to further combat impunity and, in this regard, to ensure that all perpetrators of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law are held accountable, and to continue to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, in accordance with Mali's obligations under the Rome Statute;

9. *Welcomes* the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission on 20 March 2014, and *calls on* the Malian authorities to take the necessary steps to ensure the neutrality, impartiality, transparency and independence of the Commission and to enable it to commence its work to benefit all Malians as soon as possible;

10. *Stresses* the importance of continued coordination among the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, the neighbouring countries of Mali and other key actors in the promotion of lasting peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Mali and *calls upon* these actors to coordinate their efforts in this regard with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and MINUSMA;

MINUSMA mandate

11. *Decides* to extend the mandate of MINUSMA within the authorized troop ceiling of 11,200 military personnel, including reserve battalions capable of deploying rapidly within the country, and 1,440 police personnel until 30 June 2015;

12. *Authorizes* MINUSMA to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

13. *Decides* that the mandate of MINUSMA shall focus on the following priority tasks:

(a) *Security, Stabilization and protection of civilians*

(i) In support of the Malian authorities, to stabilize the key population centres, notably in the North of Mali, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas;

(ii) To protect, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Malian authorities, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

(iii) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;

(iv) To expand its presence, including through long-range patrols and within its capacities, in the North of Mali beyond key population centres, notably in areas where civilians are at risk;

(v) To support the implementation of the ceasefire and confidence-building measures on the ground, consistent with the provisions of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement;

(vi) To enhance its operational coordination with the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF), within its resources and areas of deployment and within the framework of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, subject to an assessment of risk and in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces (S/2013/110);

(b) *Support to national political dialogue and reconciliation*

(i) To coordinate with and support the Malian authorities to launch an inclusive and credible negotiation process open to all communities of the North of Mali, consistent with paragraphs 6 and 7 above;

(ii) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict, including by enhancing negotiation capacity and promoting the participation of civil society, including women's organizations;

(iii) To support the cantonment of armed groups, as an essential step leading to an effective DDR process, in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement;

(iv) To assist the Malian authorities, and to coordinate international efforts, towards developing and implementing DDR programmes of former combatants

and the dismantling of militias and self-defence groups, consistent with the provisions of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement and taking into account the specific needs of demobilized children;

(v) To support, within its resources and areas of deployment, the conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent local elections, including through the provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective security arrangements, in the context of an inclusive decentralization process led and owned by the Malian authorities;

(vi) To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the Malian authorities, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to justice those responsible for serious abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, in particular war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of the situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court;

(vii) To provide support to the activities of the international commission of inquiry as envisaged by the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement and the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014;

(c) *Support to the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country, the rebuilding of the Malian security sector, the promotion and protection of human rights and the support for humanitarian assistance*

(i) To support the Malian authorities to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country, especially in the North of Mali, in line with the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement and the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014;

(ii) To support national, and to coordinate international, efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through technical assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programmes, as well as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities and in close collaboration with other bilateral partners, donors and international organizations, including the EU, engaged in these fields, including through enhancing information sharing and joint strategic planning among all actors;

(iii) To assist the Malian authorities, through training and other support, for the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management;

(iv) To assist the Malian authorities in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;

(v) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council and publicly, as appropriate, on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Mali and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;

(vi) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations

committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;

(vii) In support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary, safe and dignified return or local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors;

(viii) In support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for projects aimed at stabilizing the North of Mali, including quick impact projects;

14. *Further decides* that the mandate of MINUSMA shall include the following additional tasks:

(a) *Protection of United Nations personnel*

To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

(b) *Support for cultural preservation*

To assist the Malian authorities, as necessary and feasible, in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO;

15. *Requests* MINUSMA to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Malian authorities in ensuring the full and effective participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels and at an early stage of the stabilization phase, including the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, as well as in the national political dialogue, reconciliation and electoral processes;

16. *Requests* MINUSMA to take fully into account the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects in the performance of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 13 and 14 above, where undertaken jointly with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces (S/2013/110);

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of MINUSMA with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur;

18. *Requests* MINUSMA, within its capabilities, its areas of deployment and without prejudice to its mandate, to assist the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2161 (2014);

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consider the environmental impacts of the operations of MINUSMA when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context,

encourages MINUSMA to manage them, as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations, and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites;

20. *Encourages* MINUSMA to further enhance its interaction with the civilian population to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities;

Deployment of MINUSMA

21. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to enable MINUSMA to reach its full operational capacity as soon as possible in the context of a new Force laydown and, in this regard, *calls upon* Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment, including enablers, in order for MINUSMA to fulfil its mandate and *commends* troop- and police-contributing countries for their engagement in this respect;

22. *Urges* all parties in Mali to cooperate fully with the deployment and activities of MINUSMA, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Mali to enable MINUSMA to carry out fully its mandate and *stresses*, in this regard, the importance of facilitating MINUSMA's new Force laydown to extend its operations in the North of Mali, as mandated in paragraph 13 (a) (iv) above, in a complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats;

23. *Calls upon* Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of MINUSMA;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to accelerate the disbursement of the United Nations Trust Fund established pursuant to its resolution 2085 (2012) in support of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), including to enable MINUSMA's new Force laydown, in consultation with the donors;

Inter-mission cooperation in West Africa

25. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps in order to ensure inter-mission cooperation, notably between MINUSMA, UNMIL and UNOCI, appropriate transfers of troops and their assets from other United Nations missions to MINUSMA, subject to the following conditions: (i) the Council's information and approval, including on the scope and duration of the transfer, (ii) the agreement of the troop-contributing countries and (iii) the security situation where these United Nations missions are deployed and without prejudice to the performance of their mandates, and, in this regard, *encourages* further steps to enhance inter-mission cooperation in the West African region, as necessary and feasible, and to report thereon for consideration as appropriate;

French forces mandate

26. *Authorizes* French forces, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means until the end of MINUSMA's mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA

when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, *requests* France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali and to coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 33 below;

European Union contribution

27. *Calls upon* the EU, notably its Special Representative for the Sahel and its EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali missions, to coordinate closely with MINUSMA, and other bilateral partners of Mali engaged to assist the Malian authorities in the Security Sector Reform (SSR);

Obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law

28. *Urges* all parties to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law to respect and protect humanitarian personnel, facilities and relief consignments, and take all required steps to allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unimpeded access of humanitarian actors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all people in need, while respecting the United Nations humanitarian guiding principles and applicable international law;

29. *Reiterates* that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility to protect civilians in Mali, *further recalls* its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012) and 2143 (2014) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013) on Women, Peace and Security and *calls upon* MINUSMA and all military forces in Mali to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

International cooperation on the Sahel

30. *Urges* all Member States, notably Sahel and Maghreb States, to coordinate their efforts to prevent the serious threat posed to international and regional security by terrorist groups crossing borders and seeking safe havens in the Sahel region, to enhance cooperation and coordination in order to develop inclusive and effective strategies to combat in a comprehensive and integrated manner the activities of terrorist groups, notably AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and Al Mourabitoune, and to prevent the expansion of those groups as well as to limit the proliferation of all arms and transnational organized crime;

31. *Reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General to ensure early progress towards the effective implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, encompassing political, security, development and humanitarian aspects and *welcomes* in this regard the establishment of a Ministerial Coordination Platform that would meet biannually and under the chairmanship of Mali for 2013 2015, and *takes note* of the conclusions from its first and second meetings held in Bamako on 5 November 2013 and 16 May 2014;

Small arms and light weapons

32. *Calls upon* the Malian authorities, with the assistance of MINUSMA, consistent with paragraph 13 above, and international partners, to address the issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials and the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in order to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of small arms and light weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked or illicitly held weapons and *further stresses* the importance of the full implementation of its resolutions 2017 (2011) and 2117 (2013);

Reports by the Secretary-General

33. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months of the adoption of this resolution, focusing on the implementation of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, the expansion of the Force's presence in the North of Mali, and benchmarks to assess progress on the implementation of the priority tasks of MINUSMA's mandate, as defined by paragraph 13 above, and then, every three months, to report on the implementation of this resolution, in particular on the progress achieved on the benchmarks;

34. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2014/437

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 June 2014

Original: English

Russian Federation and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting with concern that the situation in the Middle East is tense and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force of 10 June 2014 (S/2014/401), and also reaffirming its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Stressing that both parties must abide by the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and scrupulously observe the ceasefire,

Concurring with the Secretary-General's findings that the ongoing military activities conducted by any actor in the area of separation continue to have the potential to escalate tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, jeopardize the ceasefire between the two countries, and pose a risk to the local civilian population and United Nations personnel on the ground,

Expressing grave concern at all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement,

Stressing that there should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF,

Strongly condemning the recent intense fighting in the area of separation and calling on all parties to the Syrian domestic conflict to cease military actions in the UNDOF area of operation, and further condemning the increased use by elements of the Syrian opposition and other groups of improvised explosive devices in the UNDOF area of operation,

Condemning the use of heavy weapons by both the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition in the ongoing Syrian conflict in the area of separation, including the use of tanks by the Syrian armed forces and opposition during clashes,

Also condemning the horrific crimes committed by some armed members of the opposition and *calling* upon all parties to the ongoing conflict to respect international humanitarian law,

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Echoing the Secretary-General's call upon all parties to the Syrian conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operation,

Strongly condemning the incidents threatening the safety and security of United Nations personnel in recent months,

Underscoring the need for UNDOF to have at its disposal all necessary means and resources to carry out its mandate safely and securely, and recalling that the theft of United Nations weapons and ammunition, vehicles and other assets, and the looting and destruction of United Nations facilities, are unacceptable,

Expressing its profound appreciation to UNDOF's military and civilian personnel, including those from Observer Group Golan, for their service and continued contribution, in an increasingly challenging operating environment, *underscoring* the important contribution UNDOF's continued presence makes to peace and security in the Middle East, *welcoming* steps taken to enhance the safety and security of UNDOF, including Observer Group Golan, personnel, and *stressing* the need for continued vigilance to ensure the safety and security of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel,

1. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

2. *Stresses* the obligation on both parties to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, *calls on* the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation, and *underscores* that there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation, including military operations by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces;

3. *Underlines* that there should be no military activity of the armed opposition groups in the area of separation, and *urges* Member States to convey strongly to the Syrian armed opposition groups in UNDOF's area of operation to halt all activities that endanger United Nations peacekeepers on the ground and to accord the United Nations personnel on the ground the freedom to carry out their mandate safely and securely;

4. *Calls on* all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of UNDOF, to respect its privileges and immunities and to ensure its freedom of movement, as well as the security of and unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations personnel carrying out their mandate, including the unimpeded delivery of UNDOF equipment and the temporary use of an alternative port of entry and departure, as required, to ensure safe and secure troop rotation activities, in conformity with existing agreements, and *urges* prompt reporting by the Secretary-General to the Security Council and troop-contributing countries of any actions that impede UNDOF's ability to fulfil its mandate;

5. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and

disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

6. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for a period of six months, that is, until 31 December 2014, and *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that UNDOF has the required capacity and resources to fulfil the mandate in a safe and secure way;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

United Nations S/2014/438

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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

Reporting period from 28 February to 26 June 2014

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my most recent report of 26 February 2014 (S/2014/130).

2. The area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained generally calm and stable. The cessation of hostilities was interrupted on 14 March, when the Israel Defense Forces conducted heavy artillery shelling into Lebanon and directed tank fire at two houses in Kafr Killa in response to a roadside explosion that hit its patrol in the area of Shab'a Farms south of the Blue Line. Three Israel Defense Forces soldiers sustained light injuries from the explosion and, in Lebanon, two houses were significantly damaged from tank fire. UNIFIL immediately liaised with both sides to contain the incident and quickly restore the calm. Overall, the parties displayed resolve to maintain calm along the Blue Line and affirmed their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), despite the lack of progress on their outstanding obligations under the resolution and the absence of movement towards a permanent ceasefire.

3. The security situation in Lebanon saw notable improvement following the adoption by the new government of security plans for Tripoli and the Bekaa. Since early April, the Lebanese Armed Forces, in close coordination with other Lebanese security agencies, began implementing the plans in Tripoli, where 32 people had been killed in the latest round of violence, and in the eastern Bekaa region. Though the Lebanese Armed Forces sustained casualties, it continued to deploy robustly. That has led to the successful interdiction of people and materiel associated with terrorist activities and to curbing violence in Lebanon. Three terrorist attacks did, however, occur: on 16 March, a suicide car bomb in Nabi Othman killed four people; on 29 March, a similar attack in Arsal killed three people; and on 20 June, another such attack in Dahr el-Baidar killed one person.

4. Cross-border shelling and shooting from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon continued, causing at least two fatalities, nine injuries and material damage. There were also at least 23 airstrikes by Syrian Government aircraft on Lebanese territory, in which four people were killed and three were injured. The

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Lebanese Armed Forces reported continued smuggling of weapons across the Lebanese-Syrian border.

5. Ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic led to a further influx of Syrian nationals seeking shelter in Lebanon. As at 11 June, there were 1,093,603 registered Syrian refugees assisted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and partners, including 49,559 in the UNIFIL area of operations, an increase of approximately 197,906 since my most recent report. With over 1 million refugees, Lebanon has the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world.

6. The inclusive government of "national interest" led by Prime Minister Tammam Salam agreed its policy statement on 14 March and won a vote of confidence in Parliament on 20 March. The two-month presidential election period started on 25 March. After one parliamentary session in which no candidate won sufficient votes to secure election and three scheduled sessions that failed to achieve a quorum, the constitutional period for the election ended without a new president of the Republic being elected. Upon the expiration of the term of President Michel Sleiman, the powers of the presidency transferred to the Council of Ministers under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam, in accordance with the Constitution.

7. On 5 March the International Support Group for Lebanon met in Paris at an event hosted by French President François Hollande and attended by President Sleiman and foreign ministers. The Group has continued to advocate greater international support to key areas affected by the Syrian conflict in Lebanon, and to underline international unity in support of stability and the continuity of State institutions in Lebanon during the formation of the government and presidential election processes. In the context of the agenda of the Group, the Government of Italy held a ministerial conference in Rome in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces on 17 June.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

8. During the evening of 14 March, an Israel Defense Forces patrol vehicle was hit by a roadside explosive device in the Shab'a Farms area (Sector East), approximately 1 kilometre (km) south of the Blue Line. Shortly thereafter, the Israel Defense Forces fired at least 10 rounds of 155-millimetre artillery into Lebanon's Bastara (Sector East) area at a distance of up to 2 km north of the Blue Line and two rounds of 120-millimetre direct tank fire into two houses in Kafr Killa (Sector East), located 12 km away from the explosion. Immediately after the first incident, UNIFIL engaged both parties, including through the liaison and coordination channels, urging their restraint, defusing tensions and facilitating the restoration of the cessation of hostilities.

9. In a letter to UNIFIL on 18 March, the Israel Defense Forces protested the incident that it described as "directionally focused fragmentary chargers set off against the Israel Defense Forces by Hizbullah". In a media interview on 7 April, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed responsibility for the attack against the

Israel Defense Forces. On 9 April, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations wrote to me (S/2014/254) to protest the attack as a severe violation of resolution 1701 (2006), and referred to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon in this regard. On 14 April, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations also wrote to me (A/68/848-S/2014/278) to condemn the Israeli fire as a "flagrant act of aggression" by Israel in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

10. UNIFIL completed its investigation into the incident and shared its findings with the parties. Notwithstanding the claim of responsibility for the explosive attack by Hizbullah, the UNIFIL investigation has not found any material evidence to establish the identity of the perpetrators or that they operated across the Blue Line. Furthermore, UNIFIL has not confirmed any connection between the houses targeted by the Israel Defense Forces in a residential area of Kafr Killa and the roadside explosion.

11. The Israel Defense Forces continued its occupation of the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. Israel has not responded to the UNIFIL proposal regarding security arrangements aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the area, which was submitted to both parties on 25 June 2011, and approved by the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL continued to raise the issue with the Israeli authorities, who did not provide any new information. On 13 occasions, UNIFIL observed Israel Defense Forces personnel carrying out operational activities in the occupied area of northern Ghajar.

12. Violations of Lebanese airspace, mostly by unmanned aerial vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft, continued almost daily in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. UNIFIL protested all violations to the Israel Defense Forces, calling upon the authorities to cease them immediately. The Government of Lebanon also protested against the violations, while the Government of Israel continued to claim that the overflights were necessary security measures.

13. Tension rose along the Blue Line on 11 May, after an Israel Defense Forces excavator, while undertaking maintenance works along the technical fence, extended its boom above the technical fence to clear vegetation close to the Blue Line in the vicinity of Naqoura. Public statements by Lebanese officials, supplemented by reports in the Lebanese media, decried the Israel Defense Forces activities as violations of resolution 1701 (2006). UNIFIL immediately engaged both parties, calling on the Israel Defense Forces to provide sufficient notice before conducting maintenance works close to the Blue Line, and requesting the Lebanese Armed Forces to exercise restraint. The Israel Defense Forces interrupted its work in the area, and the parties have since agreed that UNIFIL would complete the works in that sensitive stretch. The Israel Defense Forces agreed to provide UNIFIL more advanced notice to ensure adequate coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and is proceeding with maintenance works in other sections of its technical fence along the Blue Line. On 18 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces in a statement to the media claimed that "the arm of an Israeli bulldozer violated the Lebanese territories in the area of Labouneh for a distance of 1 metre in the air." On 19 May, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations protested the works carried out by the Israel Defense Forces on 11 May and further alleged that on 12 May debris was shoveled north of the Blue Line into Lebanese territory by Israel.

UNIFIL has found no evidence of any Blue Line violation in this context and continues to monitor the situation in close coordination with the parties.

14. During the reporting period, UNIFIL confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces violated the Blue Line on three occasions, and the Lebanese Armed Forces on one occasion. On 17 March, UNIFIL observed three Israeli soldiers briefly crossing the Blue Line in area 14B along Ghajar. UNIFIL protested the violation to the Israel Defense Forces, who denied the violation. On 26 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that it had observed several Israeli soldiers crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B30 (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces, in a letter dated 19 May, confirmed the violation, stating that it was "inadvertent and unintentional".

15. On 17 April, UNIFIL observed four Israeli soldiers crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of Bastara, where the Blue Line is not visibly marked, towards shepherds before returning south of the Blue Line. The soldiers did not heed calls and gestures from UNIFIL personnel who were standing at a distance. UNIFIL protested the violation to the Israel Defense Forces, who denied the violation. Later that day, in the same area, the Israel Defense Forces apprehended two Lebanese shepherds, aged 15 and 17, south of the Blue Line. UNIFIL contacted the Israel Defense Forces and facilitated the release of the shepherds the same evening. On 8 May, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations protested the apprehension.

16. On 13 May, two members of the Lebanese Armed Forces did not heed the calls of UNIFIL to step back and briefly crossed approximately 7 metres south of the Blue Line, while taking pictures in the area of Naqoura.

17. UNIFIL observed brief crossings of the Blue Line, mainly by Lebanese shepherds and farmers. Most violations occurred in the Shab`a Farms area, Blida (Sector West) and Rumaysh (Sector West). UNIFIL soldiers at the locations warned the civilians involved not to cross the Blue Line. UNIFIL protested against the violations to the Lebanese Armed Forces, recalling that it is the primary responsibility of the Lebanese authorities to ensure full respect for the Blue Line in its entirety.

18. UNIFIL completed its investigation into the 29 December rocket launching incident and shared its findings with the parties. As part of its recommendations, UNIFIL urged the Lebanese authorities to pursue their investigations into the incident, with a view to identifying and apprehending the perpetrators, and bringing them to justice. UNIFIL also asked the Lebanese Armed Forces, assisted by UNIFIL, to intensify efforts to ensure that there are no armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL between the Blue Line and the Litani River. UNIFIL recommended that the Israel Defense Forces should refrain from retaliation in such instances except where clearly required in immediate self-defence.

19. On a few occasions, UNIFIL observed civilians carrying unauthorized weapons in the area of operations, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). In all cases, UNIFIL attempted to make contact with the persons involved and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 3 May, a UNIFIL patrol observed a suspicious car with a passenger holding a pistol in the vicinity of Sribbin (Sector West). On 12 May, UNIFIL saw a civilian with a weapon under his belt, riding a scooter in the

vicinity of Bint Jubayl (Sector West). On 18 May, a passenger in a vehicle raised a pistol towards the UNIFIL guard at United Nations position 5-10 in the vicinity of Al Hinniyah. The guard also raised his gun to deliver a warning before the car drove away.

20. During the traditional hunting season, UNIFIL noted an increase in the number of individuals carrying hunting weapons in the area of operations, with more than 100 instances reported. The majority of the cases were observed in the areas of Meiss ej-Jebel (Sector East) and Blida. In every instance, UNIFIL patrols moved to stop the hunting activity. The Lebanese Armed Forces has primary responsibility for ensuring that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River is free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL.

21. With the exception of the incidents cited above, UNIFIL did not receive specific information or credible evidence regarding the illegal presence or the unauthorized transfer of armed personnel or weapons in its area of operations, nor did UNIFIL activities lead to the discovery of any arms caches or unauthorized military infrastructure. Open source reports of security incidents indicate that armed persons and weapons remain present inside Palestinian refugee camps. In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL does not proactively search for weapons in the south. As described in my previous reports, UNIFIL cannot enter private property unless there is credible evidence of a violation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from the specific location. Where specific information is received regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel or weapons inside its area of operations, UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, remains determined to act with all means available within its mandate and to the full extent provided for in its rules of engagement.

22. UNIFIL conducted an investigation into a bush fire that had occurred in the vicinity of B19 (Sector East) on 24 December 2013, destroying a cultivated area of approximately 46,000 square metres. In a protest letter on 26 December 2013, the Lebanese Armed Forces had imputed responsibility for the origin of the fire to operational activity performed by the Israel Defense Forces. The UNIFIL investigation did not substantiate the involvement of a person or group in the setting of the fire, and therefore did not determine any violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

23. An investigation also was launched into the impact of an unidentified object, alleged to be a bullet, on a car driven by a civilian, recognized later as a UNIFIL national staff member, on 2 March near Ramyeh (Sector West). The impact shattered the rear windshield of the car. None of the three occupants was injured. At the time of the incident, the car was at a position generally in line with the orientation of an Israel Defense Forces firing range located in the vicinity, south of the Blue Line. Based on the available evidence, UNIFIL was unable to determine conclusively whether a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) had taken place. UNIFIL recommended that the Israel Defense Forces undertake a review of all shooting range facilities close to the Blue Line in order to mitigate risks and avoid potential residual hazards on Lebanese territory.

24. The strength of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River remained at the level of approximately two brigades. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to carry out their daily coordinated activities between the Blue Line and the Litani River. UNIFIL conducted on average

10,000 activities monthly, out of which approximately 10 per cent was carried out in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

25. There were, since my last report, 17 instances during which UNIFIL patrols encountered unfriendly or hostile behaviour from local civilians. In 11 of those cases, stones were thrown, at times causing minor material damage to UNIFIL vehicles. On 11 March, three vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol in Shaqra (Sector East), after which approximately 10 civilians tried to open the hood of one of the UNIFIL vehicles. On 13 April, in the vicinity of Yarin (Sector West), civilians blocked the road in front of a UNIFIL patrol, and damaged one of the patrol vehicles with sticks and stones. On 24 April, a UNIFIL patrol vehicle in a narrow road in Blida (Sector East) was surrounded by a crowd of civilians who started throwing stones at UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers, resulting in slight injuries to four peacekeepers and slight damage to the vehicles. On the same day, in the vicinity of Yarin (Sector West), a UNIFIL patrol discovered that a UNIFIL, not permanently manned, position had been vandalized during the night.

26. In four instances equipment was stolen. On 20 March, a UNIFIL patrol vehicle was stopped by two civilians in El Adeisse (Sector East). Once UNIFIL personnel opened the window, one of the civilians took a camera and drove away. The equipment has not been recovered. On 26 March, in the vicinity of Rumyah (Sector West), a UNIFIL patrol was approached by two civilians, one of whom snatched a pair of binoculars from a UNIFIL soldier before fleeing. On 17 April, in the area of Bastara (Sector East), in the presence of Lebanese Armed Forces, a civilian snatched a camera from a UNIFIL soldier. The camera was retrieved, but the memory card was not.

27. On 6 March, a convoy of four UNIFIL patrol vehicles in the vicinity of Mafraq el-Jibbayn (Sector West) was blocked by a civilian vehicle. As the convoy attempted to leave the location, one of the vehicles was blocked by a group of civilians until the Lebanese Armed Forces escorted it out of the area. On 20 March, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol was stopped by a roadblock in Al Khiam (Sector East) by a municipal policeman and a group of civilians, denying access to the market area. In all the above cases, UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces whose intervention in most instances led to the resolution of the incident.

28. UNIFIL relations with the local population remained largely positive. UNIFIL undertook regular outreach and liaison activities with the communities present in the area of operations, including in coordination with United Nations funds, agencies and programmes, and international and Lebanese non-governmental organizations. Quick impact projects were implemented by troop-contributing countries and through the UNIFIL budget, including the provision of water and power supply equipment, and capacity-building activities. Medical, dental and veterinary assistance was provided to the local population. Medical services also were provided to Syrian refugees in the area of operations.

29. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to carry out its dual mandate of maritime interdiction operations in the area of maritime operations and training of Lebanese Navy personnel. As at 15 May, the Maritime Task Force hailed 1,334 ships and the Lebanese Navy and Customs officials inspected 263 vessels to verify that there were no unauthorized arms or related materiel on board. The Maritime Task Force conducted 85 training activities with the Lebanese Navy at sea and onshore.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

30. UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements with both parties continued to serve as the foundation of UNIFIL work in implementing resolution 1701 (2006), safeguarding the cessation of hostilities, ensuring full respect of the Blue Line, and protecting security and stability in southern Lebanon. The parties continued to engage constructively with UNIFIL, with daily effective liaison activities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, and in regular meetings of the tripartite forum. There was no progress, however, in establishing a UNIFIL office in Tel Aviv.

31. Since my most recent report (S/2014/130), there were two tripartite meetings on 24 March and 7 May, where most of the incidents and issues described above were addressed. The parties continued to concur on the importance of the tripartite mechanism to maintain communication channels, prevent tensions and escalation when incidents occur, especially in the light of the situation in the region, and demonstrated their readiness to work with UNIFIL to this end. The importance of moving towards agreed solutions for practical localized understandings in sensitive areas along the Blue Line also was discussed and options explored in this regard.

32. Following discussions at the 24 March meeting in the context of the 14 March incident, UNIFIL increased its presence along the Blue Line in the Shab'a Farms area to deter possible illicit activities.

33. In line with previous agreement reached at the tripartite forum, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the parties, undertook seasonal clearance work on the Wazzani riverbed along the Blue Line to de-escalate tensions in this sensitive area.

34. UNIFIL continued to work with the parties to erect visible markers along the Blue Line. As at 3 June, UNIFIL had cleared 307 points from mines, measured 235 points, constructed 216 points and verified 194 points.

35. As part of UNIFIL efforts to support the implementation of the strategic dialogue plan, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander invited all UNIFIL contingent commanders and their countries to promote the strategic dialogue process and consider ways in which they might be in a position to provide vital support to the Lebanese Armed Forces within the UNIFIL area of operations both on land and at sea. The strategic dialogue plan is an integral part of the Lebanese Armed Forces' five-year capabilities development plan, which is supported by the International Support Group for Lebanon. The strategic dialogue permanent committee met on 25 April to review the process and decided to nominate a maritime subcommittee and activate the training sub-committee.

C. Disarming armed groups

36. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains a substantial military capacity separate from that of the Lebanese State, which it claims serves as a deterrent against potential aggression from Israel. The Government of Israel asserts that these weapons, including large quantities of missiles, constitute a serious threat. President Sleiman continued to advocate the approach to the control of Hizbullah's arms contained in the National Defence Strategy proposal that he presented under the National Dialogue in September 2012. On 31 March and 5 May, President Sleiman chaired National Dialogue sessions attended by Prime Minister

Salam, Speaker Berri and other leaders, though not by Hizbullah or the Lebanese Forces. Participants reaffirmed the need to consider how best to take forward the national defence strategy proposal and to abide by Lebanon's policy of disassociation pursuant to the Baabda Declaration of 2012.

37. Arms outside the control of the State continued to threaten stability in Lebanon. Despite a drop in the frequency and size of attacks on civilians, twin suicide bombs on 19 February killed six people in south Beirut; and a suicide bomb at an army checkpoint in Hermel killed two soldiers and one civilian. On 16 March, a suicide car bomb attack in Nabi Othman, eastern Bekaa, killed four civilians; and on 29 March another suicide attack at an army checkpoint outside Arsal killed three soldiers. Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility for the Beirut and Hermel attacks, while the Free Sunnis of Baalbek Brigade claimed responsibility for the latter two attacks. On 8 April, two soldiers were killed in an attack on a patrol in Akkar. On 20 June, a suicide car bomb attack at a security checkpoint in Dahr el-Baidar killed a member of the Internal Security Forces.

38. A greater degree of stability appears to have been established in Tripoli. Another round of violence between the Sunni neighbourhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the neighbouring Alawite area of Jebel Mohsen from 13 to 23 March had resulted in 32 dead, with reports of heavy weaponry being used. On 1 April, upon the recommendation of the High Defence Council, the Lebanese Armed Forces began implementation of a new security plan for Tripoli involving increased deployment, including in previously inaccessible areas; the dismantling of barriers; and the indictment of at least 120 individuals suspected of involvement in the violence. More than 170 wanted individuals have been arrested and at least 20 have turned themselves in since the plan was implemented. There have been violent incidents on at least three occasions during raids by the Lebanese Armed Forces to apprehend wanted individuals, but overall the security situation in Tripoli has improved significantly.

39. Also since 1 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces and security agencies began implementation of a security plan for the Bekaa, with focus on combating the widespread criminal, drug and arms smuggling networks. It involved the issuance of dozens of arrest warrants against persons suspected of belonging to terrorist groups or for carrying out terrorist attacks. The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed additional troops to the Arsal area, undertook robust activities to interdict individuals and materiel associated with suspected terrorist activities, and arrested a significant number of fugitives. The army also arrested Syrian individuals in the Bekaa border area for illegally entering Lebanon. Several unofficial checkpoints of Hizbullah in the Bekaa were removed. The Tripoli and Bekaa security plans were implemented in close cooperation and coordination among the Lebanese security agencies, with strong political support from the Government.

40. There has been no progress in the dismantling of military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and Fatah al-Intifada. In 2006, it was decided in the National Dialogue that these bases should be dismantled. Their existence continues to compromise Lebanese sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to monitor and control effectively parts of the Lebanese-Syrian border.

41. On 28 March, leaders of Palestinian factions in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon signed a memorandum of understanding to insulate the camps in

Lebanon from regional and local tensions, including through cooperation together and with Lebanese security agencies. Despite this positive step, several camps witnessed increased intra-Palestinian violence during the reporting period. On 1 April, shooting in the Beddawi camp injured one Palestinian individual; on 7 April, clashes in the Mieh Mieh camp resulted in eight people killed; and on 9 and 21 April, two individuals were separately killed by masked gunmen in the Ein el-Hilweh camp. On 11 and 14 May, clashes erupted again in the Ein el-Hilweh camp, resulting in the death of at least one person. On 19 May, there was an assassination attempt against a commander in the Fatah Movement.

D. Arms embargo and border control

42. Representatives of the Government of Israel have consistently alleged that there are significant, ongoing arms transfers to Hizbullah across the Lebanese-Syrian border. The United Nations takes these allegations seriously, but it is not in a position to independently verify them. Representatives of the Government of Israel have continued to express grave concern at the prospect of the transfer of advanced weapons systems to Hizbullah.

43. On 27 February, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon informed me that on 24 February Israeli military aircraft had violated Lebanese airspace, raiding the outskirts of Janta town and firing several missiles within Lebanese territory, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). There has been no claim of responsibility for the strike and the United Nations has no specific information of its own in this regard. Hizbullah subsequently acknowledged that a strike had occurred inside Lebanon and stated it would respond in due course. In an interview on 7 April, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah stated that the incident of 14 March referred to in paragraph 9 of the present report was carried out by Hizbullah in retaliation for the Janta incident.

44. During the reporting period, there were repeated incidents of shooting, cross-border shelling and rockets fired into Lebanon from the Syrian Arab Republic, causing a number of injuries and material damage. There were frequent airstrikes by Syrian aircraft on Lebanese territory around Arsal, including a series of strikes in early March that killed at least four people. Also in March, 27 shelling incidents occurred along the northern and eastern borders of Lebanon, killing two people. While the rate of airstrikes and shelling from the Syrian Arab Republic has since slowed, there were at least 41 cross-border shelling incidents, demonstrating the continued risk to Lebanese civilians in border areas.

45. The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed in border areas to counter the movement of armed elements between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and have had success interdicting smuggling activities and arresting suspects wanted on terrorist charges. On several occasions, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested Syrian nationals in possession of arms, ammunition and other military equipment while entering Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces also seized a number of stolen cars in the Bekaa reportedly involved in terrorist-related activities. On 27 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces killed Sami al-Atrash, a suspect in connection with several car bombings, including that of 9 July 2013 in Beirut's southern suburb. On 3 April, the army arrested Sheikh Musheer Khodr for suspected links to terrorist activities. On 12 April, the army arrested Ali Khodr

Jaafar for suspected attacks against the security agencies in Lebanon, and Ahmed al-Atrash, who stands accused of setting up booby-trapped cars. On 25 May, Lebanese security forces arrested Sheikh Omar Bakri Fustoq, who was charged with terrorism and instigating sectarian strife. On 15 May, five judges were appointed to investigate 12 terrorism incidents that took place in Beirut, Tripoli and Hermel between July 2013 and February 2014.

46. Armed elements reportedly remain present around Arsal between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and there have been further security incidents in the town. On 29 March, a woman and a child were killed when Lebanese soldiers opened fire on their car after it failed to stop at a checkpoint in Arsal. On 30 April, five Lebanese soldiers were injured by Syrian gunmen on the outskirts of Arsal. On 16 May, three police officers were injured during a raid in Arsal. Several other shooting incidents at border checkpoints also occurred.

47. Hizbullah again publicly acknowledged their continued involvement in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic and held funerals for Hizbullah fighters killed there. Other Lebanese elements are also reported to be engaged in fighting alongside the Syrian opposition. President Sleiman continued to call for all parties to adhere to the policy of disassociation agreed in the Baabda Declaration of June 2012, including in the most recent meetings of the National Dialogue on 31 March and 5 May. In its ministerial statement of 15 March, the government of Prime Minister Salam adopted the policy of disassociation from regional crises.

48. On 22 April, after fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic caused an influx of approximately 4,500 Syrian refugees into the Lebanese enclave of Tfail, which is almost completely surrounded by Syrian territory, the Lebanese authorities organized a relief convoy to deliver humanitarian assistance to almost 6,000 civilians. Access to the area is extremely difficult. A further such delivery has taken place since and was facilitated locally, including with Hizbullah.

49. On 3 May, the Lebanese authorities implemented further restrictions to the entry of Palestine refugees coming from the Syrian Arab Republic. The Minister of the Interior informed the United Nations at the time that this action was temporary. The United Nations continues to express concern about such restrictions, as well as the decision by Lebanon's security agencies to stop renewing residency permits for Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic already in Lebanon.

50. The Government established a committee chaired by the Prime Minister and including the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of the Interior and of Social Affairs to address refugee-related issues, including the possible establishment of camps and limitations on access to Lebanon. On 31 May, the Minister of the Interior announced that Syrian refugees who returned to the Syrian Arab Republic after 1 June would lose their refugee status in Lebanon. UNHCR informed registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon of the decision, while expressing appreciation for the concern of the Government that refugee status be reserved for those in need of international protection. UNHCR reaffirmed to the Government that, in accordance with international law, a return to the Syrian Arab Republic would not in itself mean a person no longer had a fear of persecution or a serious risk to his or her life.

51. Some 80 per cent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are women and children. Problems arise in securing birth registration for Syrian refugee children born in

Lebanon. A weak legal framework, limited resources and social barriers prevent refugees at risk from receiving adequate protection. As elsewhere, refugee women and children in Lebanon are disproportionately affected by sexual and gender-based violence, including early marriage, child labour and survival sex.

52. Owing to the dispersal of refugees across some 1,700 locations, community outreach by Government, United Nations and other agencies requires significant allocation of resources and time. In all areas of assistance to refugees and protection, outreach and support for host communities, the limited availability of resources is now an acute issue. Lebanon's share of the Regional Response Plan for 2014 remains only 22 per cent funded. With the approval on 8 April of a governance structure involving the World Bank, the United Nations and the Government, the multi-donor trust fund established to help Lebanon address the impact of the Syrian conflict is now operational.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

53. Seven manual mine clearance teams, one explosive ordnance disposal team and one mechanical mine clearance team from UNIFIL, validated by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) team, were deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations from 28 February to 21 May. UNIFIL cleared more than 1,307 square metres of hazardous areas to provide access to Blue Line points, found and destroyed 116 anti-personnel landmines and reached seven Blue Line points. The UNMAS team conducted validation events, quality assurance visits of operational and explosive ordnance awareness training.

54. The Lebanese Mine Action Centre reported that, from 1 February to 30 April, it had cleared 627,607 square metres of hazardous areas, including minefields and battle areas, and destroyed 493 cluster munition items, 71 unexploded ordnance and 21 anti-personnel landmines. On 7 May, an accidental detonation of a cluster munition in the UNIFIL area of operations resulted in one Lebanese civilian fatality.

F. Delineation of borders

55. No progress was made in delineating or demarcating the Lebanese-Syrian border, including in areas where it is uncertain or disputed, as called for in Security Council resolutions 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006).

56. There has still been no reaction from either Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area contained in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641).

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

57. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings at the Lebanese Military Court against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers. The case of the 2007 attack remains open, pending new evidence. With regard to the two serious attacks perpetrated in 2008, a new hearing was scheduled on 11 November before the Military Court of Appeal in one case,

while in the other pending case, a verdict was issued at the Permanent Court of first instance on 2 May sentencing one of the perpetrators to forced labour and three years of imprisonment. In relation to two cases of serious attacks in 2011, the investigation is ongoing in one case, and in the other case further investigation is subject to the emergence of new evidence. In a case of terror intent opened in January 2014, suspects were detained and are under investigation.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

58. As at 8 June, the total military strength of UNIFIL was 10,112, including 407 women, from 37 troop-contributing countries. The civilian component consisted of 282 international and 680 national staff, including 81 and 155 women, respectively. A total of 52 United National Truce Supervision Organization military observers, including two women, are also part of UNIFIL.

59. There are 57 operational positions in the area of operations. One vacated United Nations position (UNP 2-2 in Sector West) was handed over to the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 7 April, UNIFIL temporarily deployed one Cambodian mine clearance team to assist the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in Cyprus. As at 8 June, the Maritime Task Force consisted of two frigates, including one carrying a helicopter, a corvette with a helicopter and five fast patrol boats.

V. Observations

60. I welcome the overall calm that has continued to prevail along the Blue Line and in southern Lebanon, notwithstanding the protracted conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. Sustaining this calm and building upon it is essential for Lebanon's stability and for regional security. I commend the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces for their commitment to safeguarding the cessation of hostilities in spite of the serious incident that occurred on 14 March, and for their cooperation with UNIFIL, in particular their utilization of the liaison and coordination arrangements. I am encouraged by the parties' willingness to engage with UNIFIL on establishing practical localized solutions.

61. Nonetheless, the incident of 14 March in the UNIFIL area of operations underlines that the calm cannot be taken for granted. I condemn the attack against an Israel Defense Forces patrol south of the Blue Line, later claimed by Hizbullah, and the Israel Defense Forces' subsequent fire into Lebanon, both of which constitute serious breaches of the cessation of hostilities and of resolution 1701 (2006). These incidents could easily have led to further escalation. I recall the obligations of the parties to respect the integrity of the Blue Line and protect the cessation of hostilities. Once again, I call on the parties to respect the cessation of hostilities, and reiterate the expectations of the United Nations that a party that has been attacked should immediately notify UNIFIL, and should not respond unless in immediate self-defence. I welcome the quick restoration of the cessation of hostilities thanks to the parties' utilization of the UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements. I urge the parties to continue to work towards fulfilling their respective obligations under resolution 1701 (2006), and to make full use of the de-confliction tools UNIFIL places at their disposal.

62. Major obligations under the resolution remain outstanding and require action by both parties. The imperative to remove unauthorized weapons from the UNIFIL area of operations remains a long-term endeavour. I remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving a permanent ceasefire, as envisaged in resolution 1701 (2006). My Special Coordinator and UNIFIL have continued to emphasize with the parties their obligation under the resolution to work towards this goal by taking tangible steps and laying the groundwork for future progress. Given the regional challenges, both Israel and Lebanon would benefit from consolidation of the calm across the Blue Line. I encourage them to consider ways to make progress on the objectives of a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution.

63. I remain concerned that the violations of Lebanese airspace by Israel continue unabated, in violation of Lebanese sovereignty and of resolution 1701 (2006). I call again upon the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory and territorial waters. The occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line constitutes a continuing violation of resolution 1701 (2006). I recall again Israel's obligation to withdraw its armed forces from northern Ghajar, in accordance with the resolution.

64. Visible marking of the Blue Line continues to be an essential confidence-building measure, which contributes to preventing inadvertent ground violations. I encourage the parties to address the contentious points in a constructive and pragmatic manner, and to actively seek localized practical solutions in problematic areas. Both sides, notwithstanding their respective reservations, have undertaken to respect the Blue Line, as identified by the United Nations, in its entirety. I am concerned in particular about violations of the Blue Line carried out by armed forces personnel. Full respect for the integrity of the Blue Line is a critical factor in maintaining stability and calm in the area. Any deliberate violation of the Blue Line is unacceptable.

65. I remain concerned at incidents impeding freedom of movement of UNIFIL and instances of aggressive behaviour towards UNIFIL personnel. While their number remains marginal in comparison to the overall level of UNIFIL activities, some of these incidents have the potential to compromise UNIFIL effectiveness in executing its tasks under resolution 1701 (2006). It is the primary responsibility of the Lebanese authorities to ensure that UNIFIL can operate unhindered in its area of operations.

66. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the State continues to restrict the ability of the State to exercise full authority over its territory and poses a threat to Lebanese sovereignty and stability, in contradiction with the country's obligations under resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). President Sleiman, throughout his tenure, repeatedly underlined the importance of agreeing on a national defence strategy that would help address the issue. While the recent National Dialogue sessions made positive reference to the policy of disassociation and the need to take forward the National Defence Strategy proposal, it is disappointing that some parties boycotted the latest sessions. I strongly encourage a return to full participation in the Dialogue and to its addressing the issue of arms and other issues to build upon the Baabda Declaration. I again call for the implementation of earlier decisions of the Dialogue, including for the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the military bases of the PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada.

67. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to have an adverse impact on Lebanon. I deplore the cross-border violations of Lebanese territory from the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the movement of armed fighters and materiel between the countries. The lack of progress in delineating and demarcating the Lebanon-Syrian Arab Republic border is no justification for violations of Lebanese sovereignty by any party. I am encouraged by the steps the Government of Lebanon has taken to improve security along the border, including the deployment of troops and equipment to key areas in eastern and northern Lebanon and robust efforts to interdict those trying to undermine stability in the country. I call upon the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and all parties fighting there to cease violations of the border and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006).

68. I condemn the continued participation of Lebanese citizens in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in breach of the policy of disassociation adopted by the Government of Lebanon and of the principles of the Baabda Declaration of June 2012, which were agreed by all political leaders of Lebanon. I call again on all Lebanese parties to step back from the Syrian conflict, consistent with their commitment in the Baabda Declaration, and I urge them instead to act in the interests of Lebanon in line with the policy of disassociation.

69. The reduction in violence and terrorist attacks in the reporting period is a positive development. The Government deserves credit for its security plans, and the security forces should be commended for their inter-agency coordination and their achievements. But the threat of instability remains, and it is important that the unity be sustained. In Tripoli in particular, which has suffered recurring rounds of violence since 2008, it is vital that there be follow-up in terms of reconciliation, repairs to property and economic and social assistance in order to consolidate the respite afforded by the security plan so far.

70. These successes notwithstanding, the reporting period witnessed further acts of violence against civilians and attacks against the Lebanese Armed Forces. These reflect the continued unacceptable proliferation of weapons outside the authority of the State. I call on Member States to uphold their obligation under resolution 1701 (2006) to prevent the sale or supply of arms or related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon. Continued broad political support is also needed for the security and judicial authorities to combat impunity in respect of acts of violence. The increased efforts by the authorities to bring to justice those responsible for violence are welcome, and an indicator of their commitment to combat impunity. The continuation of the trial in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon sends a similar message.

71. The achievement of the leaders of Lebanon in forming an inclusive government and the success in turn of the Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam, in undertaking important steps in the field of security and breaking longstanding impasses, for example, with regard to government appointments, has been positive. My Special Coordinator joined with others, including on behalf of the International Support Group for Lebanon, in encouraging the leaders of Lebanon to sustain and build on that constructive engagement ahead of the end of President Sleiman's term on 25 May. The achievements of President Sleiman during six critical years in office were substantial, and I pay tribute again to

his cooperation with the United Nations, in particular in respect of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

72. It is deeply regrettable that the Lebanese Parliament failed to elect a successor to President Sleiman within the constitutional timeframe. A prolonged vacancy in the highest office of the Lebanese State does not strengthen confidence and stability in Lebanon. I myself, the International Support Group for Lebanon and the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 29 May 2014 (PRST/2014/10), have urged the leaders of Lebanon to work to ensure that the election takes place as soon as possible and without external interference. It is vital, meanwhile, that ministers continue to work together effectively and that all in Lebanon support Prime Minister Salam to ensure that necessary decisions can be taken and that the State remains able to address the many challenges facing it. I also stress the need for timely preparations to ensure that parliamentary elections take place in accordance with Lebanon's tradition of freedom and democratic practice. The United Nations remains ready to help with technical support for the parliamentary election process. Lebanon needs a functioning presidency, Government and parliament. The international community needs an effective partner in Lebanon.

73. The Security Council and the international community have repeatedly commended Lebanon for its open-border policy for refugees fleeing the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the efforts of the Lebanese authorities to meet the needs of these refugees. Without prejudice to the right of Lebanon to manage its border, it remains essential that civilians fleeing the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic who are indeed in need of safety and protection are granted access and not returned in circumstances where their lives would be at risk. As the Government continues to review its policy with regard to refugees, the United Nations will continue to work closely with Government interlocutors with a view to ensuring that refugee-related issues are addressed effectively and in line with international humanitarian law.

74. Hosting the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, Lebanon exhibits remarkable generosity under challenging circumstances. Additional funds are needed to meet the needs of the most vulnerable, including women and girl refugees at risk, and to mitigate the severe stresses on host communities and public services. I encourage the international community to fully consider the risks if Lebanon is not supported sufficiently to meet these immense challenges, and I remind Member States of their collective burden-sharing responsibilities. Much work has been done to facilitate such support, including the development of the stabilization road map. I welcome the activation of the multi-donor trust fund with the help of the World Bank, and strongly encourage donors to contribute to it, or through the other mechanisms available, to ensure that Lebanon is adequately supported.

75. I again commend the Lebanese Armed Forces for its continued commitment and strong cooperation with UNIFIL in its area of operations and for its robust and effective role in addressing security challenges elsewhere in the country. I welcome the intensive effort to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces in response to the five-year capabilities development plan and the strategic dialogue. It is encouraging that work in this area is moving forward. I thank the Government of Italy for hosting the ministerial conference in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces on 17 June. I welcome the outcome of the conference, including the progress signalled in the

French-Lebanese agreement generously financed by Saudi Arabia. I encourage Member States to contribute further to the strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces, drawing on the capabilities development plan and through the strategic dialogue.

76. I thank the Member States participating in the International Support Group for Lebanon for their continued commitment, as evidenced by their participation in the 5 March meeting hosted by President Hollande in Paris, as well as that in Rome. The sustained unity and energy of the Group has helped to generate momentum on key assistance and support for Lebanon. I look forward to working closely with it in the coming period.

77. The security situation in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ein el-Helweh is of concern. I welcome the efforts of camp leaders to work with the Lebanese authorities to maintain order. The need to improve the living conditions of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, without prejudice to the resolution of the refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement, is ever more urgent. I encourage donors to be forthcoming in support of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), including to enable it to assist Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic. Recent restrictions by the Lebanese authorities on the entry of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic are a serious protection concern. I reiterate the call of UNRWA for easing access at the border, including for family reunification, transit and on humanitarian grounds.

78. Regrettably, progress has still not been made with regard to the Shab'a Farms area in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). I call, once again, on the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area that I provided in October 2007 (S/2007/641).

79. For both Lebanon and Israel the development of their oil and gas reserves is a national priority. I encourage both countries to continue efforts to address the delimitation of their respective maritime exclusive zones and the exploration and exploitation of their natural resources in a manner that facilitates this and does not give rise to tensions. The United Nations continues to follow this issue closely, given its importance for security, and remains ready to assist in this matter, should both parties so request.

80. In the face of a fourth year of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon's continued resilience is striking. As pressures continue to mount, the country remains under serious threat if efforts do not continue to address current challenges. The calm prevailing across the Blue Line makes a vital contribution to the stability of Lebanon, and to the security and well-being of the peoples of both countries. Longer-term security and stability call for an end to conflict in the region, including progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.

81. I wish to express my appreciation to all countries contributing troops and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. I pay a particular commendation to the outgoing UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander Paolo Serra, who has provided excellent service and leadership for the past two-and-a-half years. I also commend the military and civilian personnel of UNIFIL, as well as the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Derek Plumbly, and the staff of his Office, all of whom continue to play a critical role in helping to promote stability along the Blue Line and in Lebanon.

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Letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Special Representative of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces to the United Nations on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Harald **Braun**
Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

14-56340 (E) 010714 020714

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Annex to the letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the people of Syria and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (Syrian Coalition), it is my solemn responsibility to draw your attention to the grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law committed by the Syrian regime, in direct contravention of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014).

Four months after the Security Council unanimously demanded an end to the violence in Syria, the humanitarian situation there continues to worsen. Nearly 3 million Syrians are now registered as refugees. Nine million people are in need of care, while 214,000 Syrians go without access to food, water and medical care in besieged areas. Despite the adoption of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), the situation in Syria is not improving. On the contrary, with each day that passes, the lives of ordinary Syrians worsen.

It does not have to be this way. Millions of lives would improve immediately, were the Syrian regime to abide by its legal duty to implement Security Council resolution 2139 (2014). Yet the Syrian regime consistently refuses to do so. Instead, it engages in daily indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians, medical facilities and schools, in direct violation of resolution 2139 (2014).

During the past month alone, the Syrian regime perpetrated three massacres in civilian locations in Al Shajara, Saqba and Sukkari. As detailed in enclosure 1, on 18 June, an improvised camp for internally displaced people in southern Syria was struck by regime air forces in a barbaric massacre that left more than 50 people dead, among them women and children. The destruction prompted the Secretary-General to condemn "in the strongest terms the continued heavy shelling, aerial attacks and use of barrel bombs by the Syrian Government". Just two days earlier, Syrian regime air forces deployed barrel bombs on a civilian neighbourhood in Sukkari, Aleppo, killing more than 45 people.

Medical facilities and personnel have also been met by the regime's violence. Over the course of the past month, regime forces attacked two medical facilities in Rif Dimashq and Rif Idlib, leaving over a dozen dead and medical facilities in ruin. On 3 June, the Syrian regime shelled the Syrian Red Crescent's hospice care office in Homs, resulting in three deaths.

Throughout the past month, Syrian armed forces have continued their sieges of eastern Ghouta, Daraya, Yarmouk, Hajr al-Aswad and Mu'addamiyah al-Sham in an effort to starve hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians into submission. As the Secretary-General recently stated, "Starving besieged communities into surrender is not a victory." Yet, this is precisely the strategy employed by the Syrian regime in areas such as Homs, where a recent ceasefire was forged on the basis of coercion and deliberate starvation.

The wilful obstructionism of the Syrian regime offers a stark contrast to the dedication shown by the Syrian Coalition and our partners on the ground, including the Free Syrian Army, the Assistance Coordination Unit and the Interim Government, in our efforts to implement Security Council resolution 2139 (2014). Throughout the past month, we have:

(i) **Demilitarized hospitals in Aleppo**. As demanded in paragraph 10 of resolution 2139 (2014), the Free Syrian Army recently demilitarized two national hospitals in Aleppo and Izaz cities, previously occupied by the forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS). Following the Free Syrian Army's successful liberation of these ISIS-held hospitals, our forces instructed local councils to operationalize these facilities with the help of international non-governmental organizations;

(ii) **Worked to end the siege of Deir ez-Zor**. As required in paragraph 5 of resolution 2139 (2014), the Syrian Coalition worked actively to end the siege of Deir ez-Zor, where 30,000 to 40,000 people are currently trapped by Bashar al-Assad's forces to the south and west and ISIS to the north and east. The Syrian Interim Government recently allocated 85 million Syrian pounds to support the displaced people of Deir ez-Zor, more than 150,000 of whom have been uprooted from their homes;

(iii) **Delivered assistance to southern Syrian cities**. As stipulated in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 2139 (2014), the Assistance Coordination Unit cooperated with donor organizations to provide secure relief to those in need in Dar'a and Quneitra, delivering 2,031 tons of flour, as well as medicine. The Assistance Coordination Unit completed the establishment of the Al Shajara refugee camp, equipping it with the necessary kitchen, sanitation and toilet facilities. The camp now meets Sphere standards. The Interim Government's Ministry of Health also announced the formation of a Directorate of Health in the province of Quneitra, which is now working to provide medical supplies to those in need;

(iv) **Vaccinated 1.39 million Syrian children against polio**. As demanded in paragraph 8 of resolution 2139 (2014), the Assistance Coordination Unit-run polio task force vaccinated 1,393,173 Syrian children during the sixth round of its anti-polio campaign in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Deir ez-Zor, Ladhiqiyah, Raqqah and Hasakeh;

(v) **Rejected terrorism and combated ISIS**. As demanded in paragraph 14 of resolution 2139 (2014), the Free Syrian Army countered ISIS incursions into northern Syria, successfully defeating ISIS extremists in Aleppo and Idlib. As we have proved repeatedly, Free Syrian Army forces are united in rejecting terrorism in all its manifestations. The people of Syria do not want extremism and they do not want ISIS to infest their lands. That is why in June we condemned the ISIS reign of terror in Iraq, in a letter to the Security Council;

(vi) **Demanded implementation of the Geneva Communiqué**. As stipulated in paragraph 15 of resolution 2139 (2014), the Syrian Coalition pressed for a political solution to the Syrian conflict. In June, we issued a statement reaffirming our commitment to the political process and demanding the full and immediate implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. The Syrian Coalition continues to view the Geneva Communiqué as the framework for a political solution to the Syrian crisis, which the Secretary-General recently reaffirmed as well;

(vii) **Attended the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict**. As discussed in paragraph 1 of resolution 2139 (2014), the Syrian Coalition sent an official delegation headed by Vice-President Noura al-Ameer to the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict from 10 to 13 June. The delegation also included the Minister of Culture and Family Affairs of the Interim Government, Taghrid

al-Hadjli; member of the Syrian Coalition and the Kurdish National Council, Havaron Sharif; and former female detainee Asmaa' al-Faraj. The delegation attended both official and side meetings, including with the British Minister for the Middle East and North Africa. Vice-President Noura al-Ameer delivered a speech at the ministerial meeting, where she discussed the progress being made by the Syrian Coalition in the fight against sexual violence and its efforts in respect of accountability and transitional justice.

The Syrian Coalition and its partners on the ground are committed to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014). All Syrians must receive access to humanitarian aid, irrespective of their religion, sect, ethnicity or politics. However, despite our best efforts, millions of Syrians continue to be denied lifesaving assistance as a result of the Syrian regime's refusal to abide by international law.

If lives are to be saved in Syria, it is critical that the Security Council not allow Assad's intransigence to come at the expense of millions of Syrians. On behalf of the Syrian people, the Syrian Coalition therefore asks that members of the Security Council act without delay to enforce Council resolution 2139 (2014), in particular by calling on the United Nations to implement cross-border access in opposition-held territories. The Syrian Coalition and the Free Syrian Army stand ready to provide secure access in the areas under our control. It is now time for the United Nations to exercise its legal mandate to facilitate that access.

It is likewise critical that members of the Security Council reject the Syrian regime's policy of starvation into submission. In cases like Homs, the Council should be clear: it cannot accept a temporary cessation of hostilities forged on a brutal and illegal policy of siege warfare. Ceasefires such as those reached in Homs must be viewed as a deterrent, not as a model, for the future brokering of peace.

The rising death toll and humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Syria is not inevitable. The Syrian regime can be stopped, and so can ISIS. A democratic, stable Syria, built on pluralism and the rule of law, is still possible. However, it requires concerted international action by a determined Security Council. On behalf of the people of Syria, we ask that you find the unity needed to stop the suffering in Syria, and bring peace and stability to our country.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian Coalition
to the United Nations

Enclosure 1

Syrian regime non-compliance with Security Council resolution 2139 (2014)

(i) **Paragraphs 1 and 2**: The Security Council condemns violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and demands that all parties desist from such actions, including arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and ill treatment.

Violation: Illegal detainment following ceasefire in Old Homs

- On 16 June 2014, the provincial council in Homs released a statement (see enclosure 2) expressing deep concern following the Homs ceasefire.
- The council noted that following the Homs ceasefire, a large number of young men left the besieged areas of Homs and were taken to the Andalus School in the Dablan neighbourhood, which is under regime control. While the United Nations delegation was present, a large number of those held in the Andalus School were released. However, following the United Nations delegation's departure, regime officials began harassing those who remained detained at the school. Regime officials also detained at checkpoints a number of young men who had previously been released.
- There has been no way of communicating with those detained. According to witnesses, regime officials confiscated the IDs (identification) of those detained at the school and have turned the school into a detention facility by placing iron gates at every door of the school.
- On approximately 5 June 2014, 20 young men were taken to a nearby security branch in Homs. There has been no communication with them and it has been reported that regime officials committed a mass execution of those detained.
- On 12 June 2014, all those detained at the Andalus School were taken to an unknown location.

(ii) **Paragraph 3**: All parties immediately cease attacks against civilians and indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas.

Violation: Al Shajara massacre

- The Syrian regime continues to use indiscriminate weapons against civilians and civilian locations. In June, the regime continued its heavy and indiscriminate practice of barrel bombing civilian areas. Typically, regime planes drop multiple barrel bombs minutes apart in order to increase the number of dead and injured, including to deter and injure or kill first responders, including paramedics and other medical workers.
- On 18 June 2014 at 2 p.m., the Syrian army dropped barrel bombs on Al Shajara refugee camp, a refugee camp for displaced persons near the Jordanian border. Al Shajara camp has 430 tents and accommodates more than 400 families of displaced Syrians from Homs, Yabroud in Rif Dimashq and Nawa in Dar'a. The camp is located 2 kilometres from the Jordanian border, near a bakery and Al Shajara clinic.

- The camp was set up by the Assistance Coordination Unit. Hundreds of refugees were injured and more than 50 individuals were killed, most of whom were women and children. Due to the large number of injured and dismembered body parts, there has been difficulty in determining the exact number of those killed and injured. Camp residents estimate the number to be higher than those accounted for thus far.
- While bodies of the dead remain unidentified, those identified include:
  - Waleed Mohamad al-Tayasnah, 43 years old
  - Hanan Waleed al-Tayasnah, 17 years old
  - Lina Waleed al-Tayasnah, 16 years old
  - Nada Waleed al-Tayasnahi, 12 years old
  - Mohamad Ameen Waleed al-Tayasnah, 8 years old
  - Khaldoon Waleed al-Tayasnah, 4 years old
  - Malik Madeen al-Rajih, 19 years old
  - Ru'a Madeen al-Rajih, 14 years old
  - Saif Madeen al-Rajih, 12 years old
  - Mohamad Madeen al-Rajih, 9 years old
  - Yasmeen Madeen al-Rajih, 7 years old
  - Narmeen Madeen al-Rajih, 4 years old
- Many residents fled the camp following the barrel bombing due to extreme panic and fear. There remain a large number of unaccounted for individuals.

Violation: Saqba massacre

- On 18 June 2014 at 1.15 p.m., a Syrian regime MiG plane shelled a crowded civ[illegible] in Saqba in Rif Dimashq, resulting in deaths, severe injuries and [illegible]ction of civilian infrastructure. Those killed and injured were [illegible]en, children and the elderly. As more than 40 individuals were in[illegible]n the attack, some of the injured and dead were moved to medical faci[illegible]es in neighbouring villages due to the overcrowding of the medical facilities in Saqba.

Violation: Sukkari massacre

- On 16 June 2014, the Syrian regime dropped barrel bombs on the Sukkari neighbourhood in Aleppo, killing over 45 people, completely destroying one civilian building and damaging four others. In addition, dozens of commercial shops were destroyed after a fire ignited and spread in the area from the bombing. The hospitals were crowded with more than the 120 injured.
- While bodies of the dead remain to be identified in full, those identified thus far include:
  - Mahmoud Ahmad Banoud, 37 years old
  - Mohammad Moustafa Batiti, 36 years old

- Radwan Mohammad Alabdallah, 52 years old
- Anas Mohammad Kashkash, 26 years old
- Hussam Hasan Hassoun, 34 years old
- Salah Aldin Darwish, 70 years old
- Abou Ali Sidr, 37 years old
- Radwan Ayoub, 51 years old, worked in the humanitarian aid office in Sukkari
- Fawzi Bustani, manager of the services department in Sukkari
- Moustafa Bolus (Abou Almouaid), from the city of Minbej
- Anas Khoja, 26 years old
- Abdulfattah Karazon, 35 years old
- Mohammad Waleed Seddik, 38 years old
- Mohammad Ahmad Kurdi, 29 years old
- Mohammad Ahmad Setr, 37 years old
- Mohammad Shaiah Ma'rouf (a.k.a. (also known as) Shaiah Alhalabi), 25 years old
- Ahmad Mansour Sabbagh, 21 years old
- Zakarya Adel Shrimo, 35 years old
- Unknown victim who was selling cleaning products at the time of the bombing, approximately 25 years old
- Ismail Ali A'ajouz
- Zakarya Jlelati
- Bassam Kharrat
- Salah Zeno
- Waleed Zeno

– The barrel bombs also destroyed an office used for distributing humanitarian assistance, where a large number of civilians were gathered, resulting in a high number of dead.

Violation: Syrian regime's use of chlorine gas

– On 22 May 2014, the regime bombed Tamania in Rif Idlib and Kafr Zeita in Rif Hama with chlorine gas.

– On 5 June 2014, the medical council in Arbeen city in eastern Ghouta in Rif Dimashq released a report on nine cases of chlorine poisoning of differing degrees. Two of those poisoned died and two others remain unconscious and in critical condition. The other five reported severe headaches and complained of shortness of breath without any signs of chest constriction. There were witness reports that the two who died had subconjunctival hemorrhages.

(iii) **Paragraphs 8 and 10**: All parties immediately cease attacks against medical facilities and other civilian objects as well as medical personnel, and prioritize the fullest possible medical attention for those in need.

Violation: Syrian regime attacks on medical facilities and medical staff

- In the past month, the regime attacked two medical facilities: the medical facility in Zebdin in Rif Dimashq on 3 June 2014 and the Bab al-Hawa hospital in Rif Idlib on 7 June 2014. Last month, the regime targeted the Radwan Hospital in Jasim city in Dar'a and killed multiple medical workers.
- A regime air fighter shot a missile at the Zebdin medical facility at 5.30 p.m. after a long day of shelling. Due to the heavy bombardment of the city, 40 individuals were injured and were being treated at the medical centre when the air fighter targeted the facility.
- More than nine individuals were killed. Of those killed, the following have been identified:
  - Dr. Khaldoun al-Wadi, manager of Zebdin medical centre
  - Dr. Abu Hisham
  - Hasan Kazmouz, medical assistant
  - Borhan Alnemer, medical assistant
  - Mohamad al-Shablakh, medical assistant
  - Emad Harastani, ambulance driver
  - Three visiting paramedics from Hamouria Medical Centre
- An air fighter attacked the Bab al-Hawa hospital on 7 June 2014, using two guided missiles. The missiles fell near the hospital and caused severe damage to the hospital, injuries to the hospital staff and a halt in hospital operation.
- On 17 June 2014, the Syrian authorities informed the family of Dr. Ma'rouf Kasem Ismail that he died in Sadnaya jail, where he had been detained by the Syrian regime for more than a year for providing medical aid to members of the opposition. Dr. Ma'rouf was from Qusayr, Homs.
- On 13 June 2014, the Syrian regime shelled a pharmaceutical factory in Qasima in the Anjara city in Rif Halab, killing pharmacist Buschra Mohammad Abdullah, who was originally from Rif Hama. The factory was badly damaged and a number of medical and factory workers were injured.

Violation: Attack on Kafr Zeita

- During the morning hours of 24 June 2014, a Syrian regime aircraft dropped two barrel bombs on the Wesam Hospital in Kafr Zeita in Rif Hama, killing Lujain Qaddour, the three-month-old daughter of the hospital's administrative director, Dr. Yaser Qaddour. The hospital and many of the surrounding buildings and homes were destroyed, and members of the medical staff were injured.

Violation: Assault on humanitarian organizations

– On 3 June 2014, the Syrian regime shelled the Syrian Red Crescent's hospice care offices in Ar Rastan, Homs, resulting in the death of Nowal al-Yousef, a volunteer, along with two other office workers. The shelling also resulted in large-scale material damage to the Red Crescent's offices.

Violation: Syrian regime attacks on religious facilities

– The Syrian regime continues to use mosques as military posts and continues to shell mosques in opposition-held areas. On 11 June 2014, the regime shelled the Dalati mosque in Mleeha in eastern Ghouta. The minaret was destroyed as a result of the shelling.

(iv) **Paragraphs 5 to 7**: All parties must immediately lift the sieges of populated areas and allow unrestricted delivery of humanitarian aid. All parties must promptly allow United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners safe and unhindered access to populations in need.

– The Syrian regime continues its complete siege of eastern Ghouta, Daraya, Yarmouk, Hajr al-Aswad, and Mu'addamiyah al-Sham. The regime is preventing the movement of civilians and lifesaving aid like food, medicine, baby milk, medical goods and fuel in or out of these besieged areas. The regime is preventing any agency and humanitarian organization from entering these areas and continues to bombard these areas on a daily basis, using a wide array of munitions, including missiles and barrel bombs.

– The number of individuals besieged in these areas are:

  • Daraya: 7,000 individuals

  • Mu'addamiyah al-Sham: 20,000 individuals

  • Yarmouk and Hajr al-Aswad: 40,000 individuals

  • Eastern Ghouta: 400,000 individuals

– The Mukhayyam al-Wafideen checkpoint, which is under Syrian regime control, continues to be the only outlet to eastern Ghouta for those residing there or seeking to bring in humanitarian assistance. On 7 June 2014, four individuals, Mohammad Tayseer Anbar, Qasem Osama Khalifa, Samer al-Saasaani and Zuhair Talib tried to bring in humanitarian aid and were killed by a regime sniper.

– On 10 June 2014, a group of women and children tried to flee eastern Ghouta from the city of Harasta towards Barzah in Damascus. The Syrian regime shelled them and killed seven: Amjad al-Sheikh Darwish from Harasta, five years old; Shahd Abu Habra from Saqba, six years old; Majd Abu Habra from Sabqa, seven years old; Ghadeer Alhaak from Arbeen, seven years oid; Bayan al-Halak from Arbeen, five years old; Nadia al-Haj Ali from Arbeen, 30 years old; and Noura al-Haj Ali from Arbeen, 28 years old. Others were injured.

– The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate in besieged areas, especially in eastern Ghouta, day by day. Due to the regime's siege, there is a tremendous shortage of food items and medicine, resulting in malnutrition,

particularly among nursing children. In the past month, two babies from eastern Ghouta died of malnourishment and lack of medical care.

– The total number of inhabitants in eastern Ghouta is 561,353. The vast majority of those residing in eastern Ghouta are under siege by the Syrian regime, as detailed below:

- Harasta has 4,150 families and 17,845 total inhabitants
- Arbeen has 8,000 families and 34,400 total inhabitants
- Saqba has 4,800 families and 20,640 total inhabitants
- Hamooriya has 5,000 families and 21,500 total inhabitants
- Zamalka has 3,500 families and 15,050 total inhabitants
- Kafr Btna has 3,600 families and 15,480 total inhabitants
- Jisreen has 2,200 families and 9,460 total inhabitants
- Bayt Sawa has 1,862 families and 8,007 total inhabitants
- Haza has 1,700 families and 7,310 total inhabitants
- Masraba has 2,184 families and 9,391 total inhabitants
- Ein Tarma has 2,100 families and 9,030 total inhabitants
- Mudira has 1,400 families and 6,020 total inhabitants
- Awtaya has 753 families and 3,238 total inhabitants
- Bazinah has 216 families and 929 total inhabitants
- Bayt Nayim has 600 families and 2,580 total inhabitants
- Tal al-Nashibiyah has 480 families and 2,064 total inhabitants
- Harasta al-Quntara has 243 families and 1,045 total inhabitants
- Hazrama has 510 families and 2,193 total inhabitants
- Marj al-Sultan has 32 families and 138 total inhabitants
- Midaani has 703 families and 3,022 total inhabitants
- Nowla has 150 families and 645 total inhabitants
- Alshifoniya Ahl al-Balad has 650 families and 2,795 total inhabitants
- Alshifoniya Wafideen has 1,400 families and 6,020 total inhabitants
- Alrayhan has 800 families and 3,440 total inhabitants
- Madaa has 600 families and 2,580 total inhabitants
- Adra has 1,000 families and 4,300 total inhabitants
- Hawsh Nasri has 1,200 families and 5,160 total inhabitants
- Hawsh al-Dawahira has 2,500 families and 10,750 total inhabitants
- Douma has 34,500 families and 148,350 total inhabitants
- Jarshwa Bala has 650 families and 2,795 total inhabitants

- Zabdeen has 1,600 families and 6,880 total inhabitants
- Hatita al-Turkman has 600 families and 2,580 total inhabitants
- Albayad has 200 families and 860 total inhabitants
- Deir al-Asafir has 1,000 families and 4,300 total inhabitants

(v) **Paragraph 15**: All parties must work towards the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué.

- The goal of the Geneva Conference was the full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué, beginning with the establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which could include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups and would be formed on the basis of mutual consent.
- Yet, on 3 June, the Syrian regime held sham elections, which United Nations officials widely regarded as an impediment to the political process and which the international community roundly condemned as fraudulent and illegitimate.
- The Syrian Coalition highlighted the fraudulent nature of the elections in its letter to the Security Council submitted on 3 June 2014. Among the stated reasons were the following: (1) The elections were conducted in the midst of violence and devastation and at a time when just under half of the Syrian population is currently displaced. In the absence of peace, the bitter struggle to find food, safety, and security made the balloting process impossible for most Syrians; (2) The Syrian regime precluded any members of Syria's mainstream opposition from competing in the electoral process; (3) Balloting within Syria was held almost exclusively in regime-controlled areas, denying nearly half of the Syrian population their vote; (4) The elections were held in a context of widespread voter intimidation and in the absence of neutral, objective electoral monitors.
- Despite the un-free, un-fair and un-inclusive nature of the Assad regime's electoral process, the regime announced on 5 June that Bashar al-Assad had won with 88.7 per cent of the vote, with a voter turnout of 73.42 per cent. Following the elections, Assad declared that he will stay in power for a third seven-year term.
- Assad's fraudulent elections violate the Communiqué's call for the establishment of a transitional governing body to oversee constitutional reforms leading to free and fair elections in a neutral and peaceful environment.

Enclosure 2

[Original: Arabic]

Council of Homs Governorate

Office of the President

Report issued by the Council of Homs Governorate concerning reprisals and the Al-Andalus School, the "Guantanamo of Homs"

The ruling clique in Damascus adopted a policy of starving out the population of the quarters of the old city of Homs that were surrounded by regime forces. Humanitarian organizations made numerous attempts to open aid channels to those quarters, while the ruling clique ignored all resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. An agreement was then reached under the auspices of the international community. It provided that the population could leave, and that any fighters who wished to leave could do so provided that they left their weapons behind. Assurances were given that they would not be stopped or imprisoned. The agreement was implemented, and a large number of young men left the old city. They were housed in the Al-Andalus school in the Dablan quarter of Homs, which was under the control of regime forces. While the representative of the United Nations delegation was present, things went well and many of the young men were freed. However, after the delegation had left, the regime progressively tightened its grip on the remaining detainees. A number of those who had been released were turned back at checkpoints, and contact with them has been lost. About one month ago, all of the detainees were rounded up in the school playground and their identity cards were taken. Iron doors were installed on every floor of the school to imprison them, making the school into a detention centre. Some two weeks ago, 20 youths were taken to security branch offices, and contact with them was definitively lost. There are reports that the regime had them summarily executed. On 12 June 2014, most of the remaining detainees were taken to a location that remains unknown.

The Council of Homs Governorate urges the international community, the United Nations and the human rights organizations to assume their moral, humanitarian and legal responsibilities by pressing the regime to divulge the fate of those who left, and by working to secure their collective release. We hold them all responsible for the safety of the detainees.

(*Seal*) Council of Homs Governorate

16 June 2014

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Letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the letter dated 25 June 2014 addressed to you from H.E. Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed Ali **Alhakim**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-56281 (E) 270614 270614

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Annex to the letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

On 30 April 2014, the people of Iraq, with a great sense of national resolve that was witnessed by the entire world, defied the terrorists and went to the ballot box in great numbers in order to elect its representatives in the new Council of Representatives and choose a new Government, in accordance with the Constitution and in order to sustain its commitment to the political and democratic process.

The Independent Electoral Commission, with the assistance of the United Nation Assistance Mission for Iraq, then announced the results, which were recently certified by the Federal Supreme Court.

On 8 June 2014, with encouragement from several actors, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an entity that is included in the international list of terrorist organizations, took control of the ancient city of Mosul, the capital of Ninawa governorate. It then pushed south towards towns and villages where Iraqis had exercised their democratic right to vote.

ISIL has since been terrorizing citizens, carrying out mass executions, persecuting minorities and women, and destroying mosques, shrines and churches. This group now threatens several governorates, including Baghdad, thanks to external support and the influx of thousands of foreign terrorists of various nationalities from across the border in Syria.

In other parts of our country, particularly the western governorate of Anbar, ISIL is carrying out organized military operations across the Syrian border and controls a number of border crossings.

The threat of ISIL is not new to us. Iraq has been subjected to terrorist attacks for nearly a decade by Al-Qaida, which has renamed itself ISIL. The situation has become more serious over the past two years, as ISIL has repeatedly launched attacks against Iraqi territory from eastern Syria. Hundreds of foreign suicide bombers have streamed into Iraq to murder its citizens in their markets, mosques, churches, playgrounds and schools.

We have previously requested the assistance of the international community. While we are grateful for what has been done to date, it has not been enough. We therefore call on the United Nations and the international community to recognize the serious threat our country and the international order are facing. These international terrorist groups seek to eliminate borders, exacerbate violence and fan the flames of civil war. On the other hand, the Iraqi Government is seeking to avoid falling into a cycle of violence. To that end, we need your support in order to defeat ISIL and protect our territory and people. In particular, we call on Member States to assist us by providing military training, advanced technology and the weapons required to respond to the situation, with a view to denying terrorists staging areas and safe havens.

We should like you to understand that the need is urgent, particularly at our western borders, which have become a staging ground and a magnet for terrorists from around the world.

As it fights against the networks of ISIL, the Government of Iraq reaffirms that it continues to respect human rights, as set out in the Constitution and international conventions, and that it remains committed to the constitutional process, pursuant to which the new Council of Representatives will soon meet. Through that process, we will endeavour to form a new Government that represents all communities in Iraq and all components of Iraqi society. We are also committed to continuing along the path of democracy and serving as an example to the peoples of the Middle East, a region that is witnessing political changes. Iraq is furthermore committed to becoming a pillar of international friendship and a country that supplies energy to and builds sound commercial relations with the world.

At this critical juncture, we are facing a serious threat from international terrorist organizations. We therefore request urgent assistance from the international community. This assistance should be provided in accordance with those bilateral and multilateral agreements that were approved by the Iraqi Government through its constitutional institutions. It must also be given with full respect for the principle of national sovereignty and the Iraqi Constitution, and in accordance with Security Council resolution 1770 (2007), which gives Iraq the right to resort to the United Nations as it deems appropriate for the country, its interests and sovereignty, and in a manner that does not undermine its sovereignty.

Lastly, we call on all Member States to act urgently to cut off all recruitment assistance and the vast amounts of financial, media and other forms of support that are being given to ISIL.

During the past year, Iraq endured more than 300 suicide bombings that killed thousands of innocent Iraqis. We believe that all those attacks were carried out by foreign recruits who were sent to Iraq from Syria by the networks of ISIL.

ISIL is proud of these attacks and boasts of the nationalities of the suicide attackers, who come from the Middle East, Europe and North America.

This wave of mass killing in Iraq and other countries in the region and the world is an international problem and requires a collective response. We hope that the United Nations will help in organizing the fight against this onslaught as soon as possible.

We also request the United Nations to consider what Iraq and other countries are going through at the hands of the gangs of ISIL and Al-Qaida as genocide. Accordingly, the international community must stand by those States, which are Members of the United Nations.

(*Signed*) Hoshyar **Zebari**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq